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FOREWORD 
This report has been prepared for the Strategic Analysis in Science and Technology Unit 
(SASTJ of the Directorate-General for Science, Research and Development of the 
Commission of the European Communities. SAST activities are part of the MONITOR 
Programme which aims to identify new directions and priorities for Community research and 
technological development (RTDJ policy and to help show more clearly the relationship 
between RTD policy and other Community policies. 
For questions already identified as of interest for the development of Community policy, 
SAST projects provide an investigation of the perspectives opened up by science and 
technology. SAST projects thus serve as an input to the process of policy formulation. In 
the case of the SAST project to which this report contributes, "The needs and possibilities 
for cooperation between selected advanced developing countries and the Community in the 
field of science and technology", the context of policy questions includes the evolving 
economic relations between the Community and these countries, the interest to the 
Community of promoting international cooperation in science and technology with various 
types of countries, and the Community's role in European science and technology. 
This report is one of a set of country studies carried out for the project. The set comprises 
the Republic of Korea, Thailand, other ASEAN countries, the People's Republic of China, 
India, Brazil and Mexico. An overall strategic review will also be available in 1992. 
It should be borne in mind in reading the country studies that the fieldwork on which they 
are based was carried out almost entirely in the country concerned. The points of view of 
European industrialists/researchers/policy makers were not explicitly sought for this part of 
the project. (They will be sought as part of the work for the overall strategic review.) 
SAST presents this report as a stimulus to reflection and debate within the European 
Community on the best strategies to adopt towards a group of increasingly important 
countries. It must be stressed, however, that the orientation and content of reports 
prepared for SAST cannot be taken as indicating the considered opinion of policy advisors 
within the Commission services. 
NOTE 
Korea is used in this report as a synonym 
for the Republic of Korea 
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INTRODUCTION AND READERS' GUIDE 
Objectives and structure of the report 
This report presents an analysis of the workings of the S& T system in Korea. It also 
suggests areas for possible future EC-Korean collaboration in S& T. 
The results of the study are divided into two main sections: 
Part 1: Strategy review 
I. 1 . The status of S& T in Korea 
1.2. Implications for European-Korean collaboration 
Part II: Decision base 
11.1. The economy 
11.2. The S&T system 
Part I presents the findings of research conducted in Korea. It illustrates the current 
problems facing Korean industry, the need for industry to diversify its main international 
sources of technology (currently Japan and the US) and the desire on the part of Korean 
industry and government to co-operate with Europe. 
Part I also assesses: the technological problems facing small and medium enterprises; the 
poor state of the academic sector in S& T; and the striking importance of government 
research laboratories in Korea. 
Part I shows that Europe is viewed as a major new source of S& T for Korea. It assesses 
how Europe might benefit from a deepening S& T relationship with Korea in the future and 
highlights important obstacles to co-operation, both in relation to Korean market 
liberalisation and the practicalities of S&T co-operation. 
Part II provides detailed statistical information on the Korean S& T system and shows how 
S& T has evolved in relation to Korean industry. 
Four Annexes are attached. Annex 1 presents details of Korean institutions concerned with 
S& T. Annexes 2, 3 and 4 provide brief case studies of three industries: 
telecommunications, semiconductors and high definition television. The case studies 
illustrate how Japanese and US firms are collaborating with Korean firms in high technology 
ventures. 
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Barriers to co-operation 
From the perspective of many EC officials, prior to extensive collaboration inS& T, progress 
needs to be made on the Korean side regarding the ongoing and significant difficulties over 
intellectual property rights (IPR), preferential treatment of the US, market liberalisation and 
access to capital within Korea. 
Barriers confronting European businesses within Korea are central to any discussions within 
the EC over extending the remit of S& T collaboration with Korea. Until these barriers are 
overcome it is unlikely that the potential for positive and mutually beneficial collaboration 
with Korea will be exploited to the full. 
Parameters of the study 
As a first step in evaluating the potential for future EC-Korean S& T co-operation, the main 
focus of the study is the Korean economy and the views of the Korean S&T community. 
The study analyses why the Korean Government and industry is looking outwards to Europe 
at this time and why Korea is keen to reduce its technological reliance on Japan. 
The study is based largely on the views of Korean officials. It is also based on a detailed 
empirical analysis of the workings of the Korean S& T system and Korea's S& T standing 
within the international context. 
Prior to any EC policy decisions on S& T co-operation, further study needs to be conducted 
on: (a) European industry's needs and possibilities for S& T co-operation; and (b) the 
relationship between European strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in S& T 
and those of Korea. 
At the present time, the IPR and market liberalisation issues tend to dominate EC 
discussions over co-operation with Korea. The present study attempts to show that if the 
current obstacles could be overcome, substantial benefits could be gained by both parties. 
It also puts forward recommendations for S& T co-operation with Korea, based on 
interviews conducted in Korea. 
Research methods 
The report is largely based upon a series of interviews conducted in Korea by two SRA 
members during June and July 1990. A total of 51 interviews were carried out at 41 
separate institutions. Interviews took place with senior government officials, R&D directors 
of large firms, leading academic observers, directors and researchers within government 
research institutes. 
For reasons of practicality, the interviewee sample was drawn from S& T professionals and 
practicioners within Korea. Keenness to collaborate with the EC may, in part, have 
reflected the bias of the sample. 
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Care was taken to obtain the views of middle and lower managers as well as ministers, 
ex-ministers and chief executive officers of large firms. Interviews also took place with 
various committees and task forces analysing EC-Korean S& T relations. For cross-checking 
purposes, a small number of foreign firms operating within Korea were consulted, as were 
S& T experts from the British and French Embassies, the British Council and the EC 
Delegation in Seoul. 
A small number of interviews were also carried out with EC officials in Brussels. 
Information in written form was also received from the EC and incorporated into the final 
report. Most EC interviewees highlighted the barriers to S& T and industrial co-operation 
mentioned above. 
Enthusiasm for co-operation within Korea 
From the Korean side, there was a great deal of enthusiasm for establishing strong 
Korean-EC S& T collaboration. This enthusiasm was based on current perceptions of the 
Korean need to: 
- reduce its S& T dependence on Japan and the US; 
- compete within the EC market; 
- acquire and upgrade local S& T capabilities; 
- improve the status of small and medium sized firms; 
-to improve project evaluation skills in S&T. 
As the report shows, many of these needs materialised during the latter half of the 1980s. 
The strong interest in this EC research project reflected the desire on the part of many 
senior industrialists and government officials to rapidly expand cooperation with the EC. 
Most Korean interviewees were keen to embrace the principle of mutual benefit in 
EC-Korean S& T collaboration. Many made suggestions as to how this principle could be 
made operational in future S& T collaborations. 
SRA hope that the contacts made during this work will be useful for any follow up 
activities, whether in Korea or in the EC. 
The status of "S&T" and "R&D" in Korea 
This report uses the terms S& T and R&D in the conventional way. S& T refers to concrete 
fields of scientific and technological activity, such as solid state physics (science) and 
semiconductor development (technology). R&D (and engineering) refers to the activities 
needed to advance S& T (and industry). 
It is important to emphasise that most of Korea's S& T activity is in the field of technology 
(product and process), rather than science. Similarly, most of Korea's R&D effort can be 
described as development (advanced and not so advanced) and engineering rather then 
basic or applied research. 
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Within Korean universities, research institutes and firms there is little "science" or "basic 
research" in the conventional sense of these terms. 
Over the past 30 years or so Korean R&D has been developed to meet the perceived (often 
future) needs of the industry and economy. Much of the applied research and engineering 
capacity within Korea has been promoted by government through the Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MOST) in large, government funded research institutes and not in 
universities, as is often the case in other countries. 
Very recently (since the mid-1980s) firms have begun to integrate backwards from 
manufacturing and engineering into R&D, to reduce their dependence on foreign sources 
and to support their moves into higher value-added goods and services. In most areas 
basic research and theoretical science is not yet on Korea's agenda of priorities. 
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Objectives and background 
As a first step in evaluating the potential for science and technology IS& T) co-operation 
between the EC and South Korea (hereafter, Korea), this report presents an analysis of the 
workings of the S&T system in Korea. 
The study is based on a detailed analysis of: (a) the S& T and industrial systems in Korea; 
and (b) the views of a sample of 51 key Korean S& T officials from industry and 
government. The views of relevant Commission officials were also received at various 
stages during the research. 
The study shows that Korea is currently looking outwards to Europe, at this time, in an 
effort to reduce its traditional technological reliance on Japan and, to some extent, the US. 
Prior to any Commission policy decisions on S& T co-operation, further study needs to be 
conducted on: (a) the needs and possibilities for S& T co-operation from the perspective of 
European industry; and (b) the extent to which European strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats in S& T are complementary to those of Korea. 
Barriers to co-operation 
From the perspective of many EC officials, prior to extensive collaboration inS& T, progress 
needs to be made on the Korean side regarding the ongoing and significant difficulties over: 
intellectual property right (IPR) protection, preferential treatment of the US, market 
liberalisation and access to capital within Korea (hereafter "barriers"). 
Barriers confronting European businesses within Korea are central to discussions within the 
Commission over extending the remit of S& T collaboration with Korea. 
Until these barriers are overcome it is unlikely that the potential for positive and mutually 
beneficial collaboration with Korea can be exploited to the full. 
These difficulties can only be resolved through negotiation between the relevant EC and 
Korean agencies and such political pressure which may be applied by the EC. 
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The status of S& T in Korea 
Korea has traditionally had close economic and technological links with the US and Japan, 
but relatively few links with Europe. During the 1960s and 1970s Korea benefited a great 
deal from fairly liberal flows of technology from both the US and Japan. 
Most of Korea's S& T activity is in the field of technology (product and process), rather than 
science. Similarly, most of Korea's R&D effort can be described as development (advanced 
and not so advanced) and engineering rather then basic or applied research. 
Within Korean universities, research institutes and firms there is little "science" or "basic 
research" in the conventional sense of these terms. 
Over the past 30 years or so Korean S& T has developed to meet the perceived (often 
future) needs of industry and the economy, often via the Government through the Ministry 
of Science and Technology (MOST) in large, government funded research institutes and not 
in universities, as is often the case in other countries. 
Korea's need to strengthen its S&T base 
A stronger S& T capability is needed to enable Korea to shift into higher value-added, 
technology-intensive goods and services. This adjustment is vital to enable Korea to 
continue on its path of modernisation into the next century. 
Korea can no longer rely on low value-added, labour-intensive exports to sustain its growth. 
Since the mid-1980s, wage costs have risen substantially, the Won has appreciated, some 
Korean goods have become less competitive on world markets and export growth has 
begun to slow. 
More recently (since the late-1 980s) firms have begun to integrate backwards from 
manufacturing and engineering into R&D, to reduce their dependence on traditional 
Japanese and US sources and to support their moves into higher value-added goods and 
services. 
Firms and government agencies are making large investments in S& T in order to deepen 
the technological "roots" of the economy and to build up alternative international sources 
of technology. The EC is seen as the "first best" option outside Japan and the US. 
Korea's desire to reduce its technological dependence on Japan 
The major Korean conglomerates (the Chaebol) have succeeded in competing with 
Japanese firms in several high technology sectors. In response, some Japanese firms have 
begun to restrict the transfer of technology in many key areas of components, software, 
capital goods and machinery. 
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Korean strategists are agreed on the need to reduce their technological dependence upon 
Japan. This will require a substantial upgrading of the domestic S& T base. Collaboration 
with willing international partners is viewed as an important aspect of this process. 
Strained relations with the US 
The US has played a major role in forcing Korea to liberalise its internal markets and to 
adhere to international standards over IPR. This has caused tension between the US and 
Korea. Preferential treatment of the US in relation to the EC has also acted to increase the 
current problems between Korea and the EC Commission. 
However, as the Annexes show, US firms are continuing to co-operate with Korean 
companies in areas such as information technology. IPR and other difficulties appear to be 
resolved at the level of the firm. 
Korean desire for co-operation with the EC 
A strong desire for co-operation with the EC was expressed by many senior Korean 
industrialists and other S& T officials. This desire stems from current scientific, 
technological and industrial needs. 
The S& T infrastructure in Korea is weak and out of step with Korea's industrial power. 
S& T investments have been oriented towards the short-term needs of the industrial sector. 
Universities have been underfunded and poorly equipped. 
Koreans believe that a large increase in S& T links with the EC could help remedy some of 
these problems. The EC is viewed as a major potential new source of S&T, as well as an 
important market opportunity for the future. 
Korean industry is also willing to explore the possibilities of matching European 
technological competences with Korean needs and vice versa. 
The impasse over S& T co-operation 
EC Commission officials are reluctant to broaden S& T co-operation due to the difficulties 
discussed above. EC-Korean S& T co-operation is therefore at an impasse. Koreans are 
willing to collaborate, but the Commission is worried about' the dangers of one-way 
technology transfer and insufficient IPR protection. 
The potential advantages of S& T co-operation suggest that the current impasse could be 
damaging to the long-term technological and economic interests of both parties. 
Sast Project 1 Report on Korea - Page iii 
Executive Summary 
Potential benefits for the EC 
As a major Pacific Basin economy, Korea is a potential partner for European firms 
attempting to gain a "window" to the Pacific Basin regional network of markets, low cost 
components and low cost labour (particularly in neighbouring economies in which Korea has 
interests). 
Through strategic partnerships or jointly-owned ventures in certain areas, it might also be 
possible for EC firms to gain access to Korean expertise in mass-manufacturing process 
technology in sectors such as consumer electronics. This could be exchanged, say, for 
European expertise in R&D and standards technology. 
Very few European firms are involved in such ventures when compared with Japanese and 
US companies. 
S& T co-operation at the pre-competitive level, could increase the number of near-to-market 
collaborations, building up valuable personal contacts and an improved cultural 
understanding between both parties. 
From the Commission perspective, such strategies assume that IPR and other problems can 
be resolved. 
However, as the case studies for electronics show, major ventures between Japanese, US 
and Korean firms are continuing, despite the tightening of technology transfers to Korea. 
The S& T impasse could mean that both Europe and Korea miss the opportunity presented 
by Korea's current restructuring, and that the EC presence in Korea falls further behind that 
of Japan and the US. 
Other collaboration barriers 
Some Korean's expressed general concerns over their perceptions of protectionism within 
Europe. The idea of "fortress Europe" is strong within some Korean circles. 
Many Koreans expressed a preference for the more familiar Japanese and US technology 
sources. In several high technology sectors European technology is ranked second or third 
after that of the US and Japan. 
Also, many Korean officials are not sure whether they are permitted to participate in EC 
programmes, nor under which circumstances they should deal with the EC, as opposed to 
individual nation states. These barriers would also need to be addressed prior to extensive 
co-operation. 
Specific opportunities for S& T co-operation 
Korean academics feel that at the basic S& T level there are now major opportunities for 
co-operation with Korean universities and government funded research institutes. 
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Similarly, industrialists believe there is scope for exploring mutually beneficial collaboration 
in near-to-market technology areas. 
A range of S&T fields in which Korea is keen to collaborate is identified in section 1.2.11 
of the report. These include nuclear power and waste management, energy conservation 
technology, offshore oil development, information technology, biotechnology, oceanology 
and medical research. 
Next steps 
In spite of the position of the Commission on IPR and other barriers, the Korean President 
recently signed agreements on S& T co-operation with EC member states, notably France 
and the UK (in 1989). In France, for example, a programme of co-operation between the 
CNRS and Korean R&D laboratories has begun. 
Also in near-to-market areas, the French Government has reached agreement on joint 
ventures in construction, industrial plant and natural resources. 
Given that co-operation is proceeding between member states and individual firms, 
assessment needs to be made of: 
(a) the needs and opportunities for S& T collaboration from the perspective of EC industry; 
(b) subsidiarity - what, if any, is the proper role of the EC in S& T co-operation with Korea, 
in relation to member states. 
Above all, major efforts need to be made to resolve IPR and other difficulties at the 
appropriate political levels by both parties, as the current impasse rules out any major, 
wide-ranging EC-Korean initiatives on S& T co-operation. 
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PART I :STRATEGIC REVIEW 
1.1.- THE STATUS OF S&T IN KOREA 
1.2.- IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN-KOREAN COLLABORATION 

Strategic Review 
1.1. THE STATUS OF S& T IN KOREA 
1.1.1. TIGHTENING UP OF INTERNATIONAL S&T FLOWS 
- S& T links have been strongest with Japan and the US 
Korea has traditionally had a close relationship inS& T with the US and Japan, but relatively 
few links with Europe. During the 1960s and 1970s Korea benefited from fairly liberal 
flows of technology from both the US and Japan. 
US flows of S& T originated in government to government co-operative relations. For 
instance, the US under President Johnson was largely responsible for the formation of 
Korea's first and foremost government S&T establishment (the Korean Institute for Science 
and Technology, KIST, established in 1966). Government relations led to strong firm to firm 
relations and private sector co-operation in technology. 
In contrast, Japanese relations began as commercial, firm to firm links. Korean firms 
manufactured industrial products under licence from Japanese companies. These 
interactions involved technology flows from Japan and led to more formal government to 
government relations in S&T. In recent years Japan has supplied much of the industrial 
technology which enabled the large Korean firms to compete successfully in world markets. 
Recent collaborations with Japan include the agreement to involve Korea in Japan's Human 
Frontiers Programme (a cross-sectoral national programme covering environmental issues 
and quality of life). Korea and Japan have also agreed to collaborate in new materials, 
nuclear power and several other areas (although Korean newspaper reports are sceptical 
of the benefits, given Japan's new reluctance to transfer technology to Korea). 
For many industries Japan has been the leading supplier of strategic technology inputs for 
Korea. Links between the two economies are very close. Many Korean directors and 
engineers speak Japanese and are familiar with the Japanese system of conducting 
business and licencing technology. 
- Japan has begun to restrict technology transfer 
As Korea has become a major competitor, Japan has become more reluctant to transfer 
technology in many key areas of components, software, capital goods and machinery. 
Within Korea there is a common view that Japanese firms have formed a consensus 
(implicitly at least) not to supply strategic technology inputs to Korea. Many observers 
within Korea believe this effort to have become very effective in the latter half of the 
1980s. Some Korean's believe they are experiencing the "tail end" of technology transfer 
from Japan. Koreans claim that in some cases, the large Japanese conglomerates have 
begun not only to restrict technology flows to Korean competitors, but also to pressurise 
their own high technology suppliers to restrict transfer of strategic technology inputs. 
Japan has not totally "dried up" as a source of technology. Some analysts in Korea believe 
that informal channels of technology transfer may still operate effectively and that 
competition within Japan to sell machinery and technology will undermine any attempts to 
restrict technology flows. However, there can be little doubt that formal channels of 
Japanese-Korean technology transfer do not function as smoothly as before. 
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- Relations with the US have also become strained 
Like Japan, the US has become a less constant and reliable source of technology. The US 
has played a major role in forcing Korea to liberalise its internal markets, to adhere to 
international standards over intellectual property rights and patent protection, to cease 
dumping products on international markets (an accusation Korea strenuously denies) and 
to reduce Korea's large balance of payments surplus with the US. 
Korean observers hope that the recent government efforts to demonstrate adherence to 
intellectual property rules and patent law well reduce some of the tension between the US 
and Korea. Korea has also recently become a net importer of goods and services. Korean 
officials hope that these factors, plus the efforts to liberalise local markets, will lead to 
improved technology transfer relations with the US overall. 
- Potentially, the EC is an attractive new source of technology 
The recent disputes with the US and Japan have exposed an important technological 
weakness in the Korean economy. Korean observers believe that to overcome Japanese 
and US efforts to restrict technology transfer, it is necessary to diversify their technological 
sources and to reduce their overall dependence on international suppliers of technology. 
The EC is seen by many in government and industry as an important alternative (if 
potential) source of technology. The attractiveness of direct access to the EC market also 
indicates that the EC is a 'first best' regional option for expanding technological sources 
beyond the traditional ones. As discussed below, methods of technological acquisition 
include direct foreign investment, jointly owned ventures in Europe (and East Asia), 
collaboration with academic institutions, and strategic partnerships between Korean and 
EC firms. 
There is also a strong current interest in Eastern Europe and especially the USSR. Eastern 
Europe is viewed as having a strong science base, complementing Korea's powerful 
production and marketing capabilities. This complementary match could work to the benefit 
of both parties. In March 1990 a 21 member Soviet delegation met with Korean officials 
to discuss S& T collaboration. The Soviet Union has requested assistance from Korea to 
convert military plant to civilian purposes. The Soviet Union has offered Korea a reported 
786 proprietary technologies, of which 325 are "available for commercial use" (Korean 
Economic Journal, 11 June 1990). 
However, the current fascination with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe may be short 
lived. Korean firms are learning of the financial and economic difficulties of dealing with 
the Soviet Union. For instance, Korean firms are facing problems in obtaining hard currency 
payments for goods and services sold. 
1.1.2. THE WORSENING ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
During the 1970s and the early part of the 1980s, the domestic and international economic 
environment was undoubtedly favourable to Korea's export-led growth strategy. The Won 
remained low against the appreciating Japanese Yen and the Dollar (leading to technology 
licencing by Japanese firms, as well as export competitiveness vis a vis Japan and the US). 
Labour costs were relatively low. Labour unrest was not a major problem. US and 
Page 4 - Sast Project 1 Report on Korea 
Strategic Review 
Japanese technology flows were fairly liberal. Local interest rates were low. The large 
conglomerates enjoyed considerable support from the Korean Government. Also, there 
was relatively little competition from low wage East Asian economies (e.g. Thailand). 
Inflation was low. Industrial growth was extremely rapid. Local markets were effectively 
protected from foreign competition. The balance of trade was generally strong and 
positive. 
In the latter part of the 1980s the position changed considerably. Korea began to suffer 
from: 
- increasing protectionism from Japan and the US 
- the liberalisation of internal markets 
- the need to adhere to international IPR standards 
- rapidly growing importation of consumer goods 
- a shift to a balance of trade deficit for the first time 
- a slow down in export growth 
- the rise of double digit inflation 
- severe labour unrest 
- rising labour costs leading to 
- competition from low cost East Asian economies 
- recent Yen depreciation 
- an appreciating Won. 
These problems have dented Korean confidence in their economic success. In a sense, the 
difficulties being experienced are the growing pains of an extremely successful economy. 
Korea is now confronted with the need to restructure its economy, industry and technology 
to cope with the problems of success. 
- The Korean economy is confronting a series of transitions 
(a) from export led growth to domestic demand 
(b) from a low wage to a "medium" wage economy 
(c) from low to high(er) value-added production 
(d) from assimilative to innovative technological behaviour 
(e) from central direction to increased reliance on market mechanisms 
(f) from mass produced low margin products to technology intensive 
goods and services. 
A large part of the adjustment which needs to be made depends on the continued 
technological upgrading of the economy. This process of technological adjustment will 
involve: the large Korean conglomerates; small and medium sized firms; the government 
R&D institutes; and the Korean university system. It will also involve a restructuring of 
Korea's international S&T relations with the US, Japan and the EC. The rest of this section 
focusses on these issues. 
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1.1.3. TECHNOLOGICAL DEEPENING AND DIVERSIFICATION 
STRATEGIES FOR THE 1990S 
- A consensus is reached on technology strategies 
Two sets of technology strategies are being pursued to achieve the restructuring of the 
industrial sector. These can be termed technological deepening and technological 
diversification. Both strategies are an attempt: (a} to overcome the restrictions on 
international technology transfer to Korea; and (b) to promote local product and process 
innovation. Deepening refers to indigenous efforts to improve the industrial R&D base. 
Diversification refers to effort to diversify sources of technology beyond the US and Japan. 
These strategies involve government, industry and academia in new R&D activities. There 
is a broad measure of consensus among the different groups on the main objectives for 
Korea in the 1990s, as well as the methods by which the objectives are to be achieved. 
A successful backward integration into S& T by industry is generally viewed as a critically 
important facet of Korea's overall industrial restructuring. In the 1990s, the economy is 
to move from growth based on cheap labour to growth based on high technology. 
The leading Chaebol are committed to a large increase in R&D expenditure and effort, as 
is the Korean Government through the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry. For the first time in Korea, a major attempt is being made to 
strengthen the university base in S& T. Thirteen centres of excellence (science and 
engineering research centres) were financed in 1989 by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology in key areas such as artificial intelligence, new materials, bio-technology and 
semiconductor physics. One hundred such centres are planned by the year 2000 (see 
academic section below). Most of the government research institutes are. now in the 
process of moving away from industry-related R&D towards more generic, advanced 
research (orientated towards industry needs). As large firms set up their own R&D 
laboratories, the government R&D units are searching for a new role for themselves. 
As already noted, Japan and the US have begun to restrict flows of technology to Korea. 
This is leading Korean firms into a diversification of international technology sources. The 
attractiveness of direct access to the EC market also suggests that the EC is a 'first best' 
regional option for Korea's search for new sources of technology. 
1.1.4. INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING: A SHIFT TO "FLEXIBLE 
CONGLOMERATION" 
- In the 1970s the emphasis was on low cost labour 
Up to the end of the 1 970s Korea's 30 or so large conglomerates deployed their highly 
motivated, low skilled labour in mass production industries: first, through low-margin, 
high-volume, light industries such as textiles; then in the 1970s, the heavy industries of 
steel, construction and shipbuilding; in the 1980s the dynamic sectors have been the more 
capital and technology-intensive sectors such as consumer electronics, computers and 
electronic components. 
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Prior to the 1980s, the Chaebol aimed at relatively stable, low price/low profit margin, large 
scale markets. Industrial organisation was based on fairly rigid, hierarchical line 
management systems. As much of the technology was acquired under licence from 
overseas, the firms made little investment in R&D (especially basic and applied research) 
or science. 
The prevailing industrial structure is widely viewed as immature and unwieldy. 
Management styles have to change to meet the demands of the 1 990s. 
- Now the economy needs more R&D and higher value-added production 
Korea is now facing an ongoing structural adjustment from cost-based competitive 
advantage (based primarily on cheap labour) to technology based competitive advantage, 
centred on higher value-added products, higher skilled labour and professional management. 
A vital component of this strategy is a greater corporate commitment to R&D. The 
conglomerates have increased their spending on R&D but many feel that higher levels of 
investment are needed. There is strong political pressure as well as economic pressure for 
the Chaebol to increase R&D expenditures. The evidence suggests that they are 
responding positively. 
There is also a pressing need for greater management and organisation flexibility to assess 
and respond to market needs. This in turn requires less hierarchy, more decentralised 
management systems and delegation of strategic decision making to the industry operating 
units. 
On these general issues there is widespread agreement across industry, government, and 
the academic sector. This consensus was arrived at only very recently ( 1989-1 990). 
- The conglomerates intend to become more flexible 
The transition faced by the conglomerates can be characterised as a shift from the mass 
production (or "Fordist" after Henry Ford) paradigm to a more flexible, technology intensive 
and market responsive paradigm. It is important to remember that this shift is occurring 
in steady incremental, if painful, steps and not a once-and-for-all adjustment. For instance, 
in rapidly changing areas such as consumer electronics the transition has already begun. 
However, it is a costly and difficult learning process for industry. 
Organisational hierarchies remain too bureaucratic and sluggish to respond to rapidly 
changing high technology markets. In his analysis of the Korean position, Michael Porter 
(a leading management theorist) recommends that the Chaebol break up and divest 
themselves of their many industrial enterprises in order to become market leaders in 
relatively few sophisticated, high technology markets (see Korea Business World, March 
1988 pp9-1 0). Porter argues (a) conglomeration works well in an economy where little first 
class management exists and the driving need is to raise capital and add value and (b) at 
this stage the Korean economy will not develop if the conglomerates remain the engine of 
development. 
- But they intend to remain conglomerates 
However, the general view within Korea is that the conglomerates will not divest or break 
up into more flexible, specialised industrial units. Rather, the history of the industry and 
the nature of the firms (and their owners) suggest that the firms will attempt to achieve a 
Sast Project 1 Report on Korea - Page 7 
Strategic Review 
form of "flexible conglomeration": large conglomerates with technology-deep, flexible, 
market responsive operating units. Korean executives hope that this new organisational 
form will be characterised by: 
(a} the advantages of flexible management styles: 
- decentralised management 
- independent profit/cost units focussing on specialist sectors 
- customer-responsive marketing 
- higher value-added, niche product markets 
- capture of software and service markets 
- backed by in-house R&D and innovation 
(b) combined with the advantages of conglomeration: 
- large financial economies of scale 
- global marketing outlets 
- the financial and technology capacity to overcome large barriers to entry in new 
markets 
- ability to withstand short term market downturns and financial loss in specific sectors 
(e.g. in semiconductors) 
-the ability to cross-subsidise new areas from high profit-making industries (e.g. 
Samsung' s subsidy of semiconductors from its telecommunications operations). 
Whether the Chaebol manage to achieve this combination of advantages remains to be 
seen. However, the Porter argument probably underestimates the potential for 
decentralisation within the Chaebol. It also misjudges the likely pattern of Korean industrial 
development, which may well follow (in some respects) the "Japanese route" of large 
multi-product, multi-technology corporations, rather than the more typical US model of 
focused, relatively concentrated corporate structures. The Chaebol will continue to expand 
but there will probably be a lower rate of diversification in the future. 
If successful, the Chaebol will reap the advantages of technology deepening. The greater 
technological autonomy generated will lead to less reliance on overseas suppliers for 
strategic inputs. The ability to generate new product designs and process technologies will 
enable the large firms to become market leaders rather than followers. The successful 
technological transition of the Chaebol is therefore central to Korea's overall economic 
strategy. 
- Changes, to date, reveal a mixed picture 
Evidence of corporate efforts to change is plentiful, ranging from Goldstar's new CU 
(Cultural Unit) organisation to Samsung's massive investment in R&D near Taedok Science 
City (see Part 3). Overall, private as well as public R&D spending has increased 
substantially and plans exist to increase still further the ratio of R&D spend to GOP. 
(However, it should be noted that corporate R&D figures include items such as manpower 
and engineering costs, not normally classified as R&D in the West. This practice enables 
firms to claim tax relief on R&D spending and other benefits). 
In making the changes, Samsung and more recently Goldstar are seen as leaders. Some 
conglomerates are relatively slow to change (e.g. Daewoo), preferring to rely on more 
traditional market-driven management and R&D. Daewoo still spends roughly 70% of its 
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R&D budget on short-term product/process needs (information from interview, June 1990). 
The Chaebol are still, to some extent, led by first generation entrepreneurs (often family 
members) who excelled in the "mass production" paradigm. The second generation 
directors understand modern management techniques and see their role as "co-ordinators 
rather than dictators", as one interviewee put it. 
The leading Chaebol have embraced the new corporate philosophies with enthusiasm. 
Goldstar, for instance, has recently undergone two major restructurings. The new Cultural 
Unit approach was the result of an in-depth Mackinsey consultancy project carried out in 
1988. Executives are encouraging intra corporate entrepreneurship (called 
"intrapreneurship") to overcome rigidities and to continually renovate organisational 
structures and practices. 
Even with strong management commitment, such major structural changes are very difficult 
to carry out. Old practices are difficult to change and the Chaebol are extremely large 
(Samsung for instance has around 150,000 employees). 
1.1.5. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESS OF A SELECTION 
OFKOREANINDUSTruES 
During the 1970s and 1980s Korea developed significant strengths in a number of high 
technology and capital intensive industries. The electrical and electronics sector is an area 
of comparative overall strength, accounting for 21% of total exports in 1988 and around 
36% of total corporate R&D spending. 
As Annex 2 shows, in the electronics components field Korea is strong in mass produced 
standard semiconductors (e.g. discrete products and 256K and 1 megabit DRAMs), but 
weak in application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), computer-aided design systems, 
factory automation, capital goods and material inputs. 
In telecommunications (Annex 3), Korea is strong in telephones handsets, small rural 
exchanges, private branch exchanges, facsimilie machines, optical transmission and digital 
microwave. In contrast, Korean producers are weak in advanced systems such as large 
scale public switches, ASICs for public exchanges, high performance video phones and 
laser technology. 
In consumer electronics Korea is very competent in colour TVs, hi fi, VCR and camcorders 
but lags several years behind the market leaders in Japan, the US and Europe in high 
definition television (HDTV) (see Annex 4). In conventional colour TVs, Korea's main 
strengths lie in mass manufacturing, scale intensive operations. However, even here Korea 
is fairly weak in digital circuitry (design and manufacture) and computer integrated 
manufacturing. In terms of assembly (e.g. chip insertion and automatic soldering) Korea 
is almost on par with Japanese market leaders. In HDTV areas such as display production 
technology, projectors, integrated circuitry (e.g. decoders, signal processors and 
converters) and flat panel antennae, Korean companies are far behind the world technology 
frontier. 
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In mature, light industries such as apparel and clothing and footware, Korea is a world 
leader. Apparel and clothing accounted for 14.3% of total Korean exports in 1988, while 
footware accounted for 6.3% of exports. 
In heavy industries such as shipbuilding, iron and steel and passenger vehicles Korea is a 
major exporter (these items accounted for 2.9%, 5.0% and 5.5% of exports in 1988, 
respectively). During the late 1970s and early 1980s Korea built up impressive capabilities 
in petrochemicals, basic machinery, fine chemicals and primary metals. 
Fine chemicals are typically high value-added, technology intensive and resource efficient. 
Fine chemicals accounted for around 60% of total value added in chemicals in 1986. This 
compares well with the US and Japan but poorly with the EC. Conversely, Korea is a major 
importer of intermediate raw materials and weak in several industries related to chemicals. 
In advanced manufacturing systems and factory automation, Korean industry has been slow 
to adopt and manufacture products. However, the industry is active at the lower end of 
the factory automation spectrum (e.g. numerically controlled machine tools, fixed seQuence 
robots and automated materials handling systems). Korean production of programmable 
logic controllers (PLCs) is growing rapidly, accounting for around 30% of the domestic 
market in 1988. Production of PLCs is mostly through joint ventures with Japanese and 
US firms. 
Robotics have taken off very Quickly in the last five years. Production is mainly in relatively 
simple discrete units for high volume sectors such as automobiles and electrical 
components. Japan accounts for roughly 70% of total robots used in Korea, the US 20% 
and Korea 1 0%. As in most other markets the EC lags behind, accounting for roughly 2% 
of robots used. 
Aerospace is emerging as a new export industry. The Chaebol have set themselves the 
task of becoming major manufacturers of aircraft over the next decade or so. Exports are 
estimated to have risen from $21m in 1988 to around $850mn in 1989 to $2bn in 1990 
(EIU, 1990). Much of this activity was in defence related contracts. 
1.1.6. THE POSITION OF SMALL AND MEDIUM SCALE 
ENTERPRISES (SMEs) 
- Small and medium firms have lagged behind the Chaebol 
Most analysts in Korea believe that industry suffers from a severe weakness in the area of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs). This is a result of the economy's almost exclusive 
reliance on the Chaebol. For mobilising resources and entering mass production industries 
the Chaebol proved extremely effective. However, rather than working with local firms, the 
Chaebol licenced in foreign technology. In contrast to Japan, small and medium firms have 
not grown up in parallel with the conglomerates. 
The SMEs which exist are few in number (relative to the support needed for the large firms) 
and technologically unsophisticated. SMEs have traditionally played a sub-contracting role 
for the large firms, providing low cost, mature technology inputs to industry. In Korea, 
SMEs tend not to be technology suppliers, innovators or specialist producers of capital 
goods and materials. 
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- There is widespread agreement on the need for upgrading SMEs 
To achieve the transition to higher value-added industry, the economy needs a large 
number of new technology-based SMEs. This is a widespread view, held by leading 
economists, the large firms themselves and government ministries such as MOST and MTI. 
The leading Chaebol (e.g. Samsung and Goldstar) now recognise the importance of 
nurturing SMEs in high technology areas. SMEs are needed to support the large firms with 
capital equipment, materials, fine machinery parts, components and software. In 
craft-based, "human-orientated" technologies (e.g. software applications) suited to small 
size, low overheads and market agility, SMEs have clear advantages over the Chaebol. 
Increasingly, the large firms intend to become systems integrators, supported by SME 
suppliers of components, sub-systems and other technology inputs. 
A strong base of SMEs will reduce the large firms' dependence on competitors (particularly 
Japanese firms) for technology, enable Korea to establish a custom software sector for the 
electronics industry, provide a local source of vital automobile parts and, in general, build 
the technological 'roots' to enable the large firms to move into high technology markets. 
In 1986 the Ministry of Trade and Industry launched a national campaign to enhance the 
productivity of SMEs through the KPC (Korean Productivity Centre) and the SMIPC (Small 
and Medium Industry Promotion Corporation). Like KAITECH, these institutions began very 
recently. KPC provides consultancy, industrial automation support, re-education, 
engineering services and other productivity-enhancing programmes for SMEs. 
- SME development poses major difficulties 
Nurturing technology-based SMEs in Korea is an extremely difficult task. Korea lacks the 
US and European tradition of venture capital start-ups. The economy also lacks the 
Japanese tradition of large firm sponsorship of vital small companies. Entrepreneurship has 
been confined to the Chaebol where spin-offs are few and far between. 
To make matters worse, government support for SMEs faces severe difficulties. The 
government machinery is familiar with supporting large firms, not SMEs. Also, government 
SME programmes may "backfire". The need for careful evaluation of government spending 
may dampen such entrepreneural spirit which does exist and add bureaucratic interference 
to the problems faced by small companies. The need to evaluate specific support projects, 
the danger of slowing down SME progress and the difficulties of actually creating the 
environment for SMEs to flourish are problems currently facing Korea. 
In order to acquire capabilities to promote SMEs Koreans are looking towards the EC and 
other regions. For instance, under the Korean-French Industrial Co-operation programme, 
the Korean Small and Medium Industry Promotion Corporation has formed a joint venture 
with the French Association for the Promotion of Industrial Development (APRODI). In the 
SME area there may well be more scope for EC-Korean collaboration. 
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1.1.7. S&T IN THE ACADEMIC SECTOR 
- University R&D facilities are poorly developed in Korea 
To date, the academic sector in general and the university sector in particular have made 
relatively little contribution to the S& T system in Korea. It is true to say that there are few 
distinctive S& T competences in the Korean academic sector. University S& T research has 
suffered from a lack of government financial support and a lack of priority from the Ministry 
of Education. Instead, the government has focused its R&D resources on the large research 
institutes which exist outside the academic sector. (These are sponsored by the Ministry 
of Science and Technology rather than the Ministry of Education). 
Within Korea, many argue that (traditionally) there has been little commitment to S& T on 
the part of most universities. Universities have been centres for teaching rather than 
research. Consequently, the university sector is not well adapted to the needs of high 
technology industry. According to this view, an alternative research institute structure was 
necessary to overcome the unwillingness of universities to embrace industrially-related 
R&D. 
Universities have been a source of manpower rather than a contributor to the S& T needs 
of the economy. In this sense, the weakness of the university sector resembles that of 
Japan. However, within Japan several of the top universities (e.g. Kyoto) boast world class 
scientific and engineering groups. Korea does not yet boast such capabilities. Most would 
agree that universities suffer from a serious lack of R&D funds and poor equipment and 
facilities. 
Korea has relied heavily on overseas universities, particularly the US, for training and PhD 
superv1s1on. There are now many Koreans in government research laboratories and 
academia who have PhDs from US universities. Japan and Western Europe have also 
provided a channel for this type of training. 
- Links with industry are poor 
Firms complain that despite the numbers of college graduates from Korean universities 
(often 1 0 applicants for each engineering job) the quality of applicants is very low and 
substantial further training is needed in basic engineering. Industry also claims that such 
work that is carried out is remote from the needs of industry and driven by the need to 
publish. Universities, in general, are not at the stage of operating research laboratories. 
There appears to be very little systematic university-firm collaboration in Korea. However, 
there are some exceptions. In the areas of process modelling and flat panel displays, for 
instance, universities perform very useful functions for industry. 
There are some pockets of excellence in academia, but these are few in number and 
confined to small groups. In general, work carried out would not be classified as scientific 
or basic research, or even exploratory technological research. Work tends to be applied 
research rather than basic science. 
- University S& T groups are soon to be strengthened 
As part of the Korean Government's S& T strategy, there is now a strong commitment to 
improve the university position. Very recently the Ministry of Science and Technology has 
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established a plan to strengthen university R&D act1v1t1es. In 1989 13 centres of 
excellence in science and engineering research (called SRCs and ERCs) were set up in: 
- topology and geometry 
- theoretical physics 
- semiconductor physics 
- organic chemistry 
- molecular microbiology 
- plant molecular biology and gene manipulation 
- advanced fluid engineering 
- artificial intelligence 
- sensor technology 
- spacecraft research 
- thin film fabrication and crystal growing for advanced materials 
- biotechnology process engineering 
- animal resources. 
The centres, at present, amount to small groups selected according to reputation and ability 
to work with industry. The SRCs and ERCs are funded by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, although they operate within the academic sector (usually funded by the 
Ministry of Education). If successful, the centres will mark a turning point in the fortunes 
of universities in the field of S& T. 
A total of 100 SRCs and ERCs are planned by the year 2000. Their mandate will be to 
develop technology in collaboration with firms, the government research institutes and 
other universities. The centres are being encouraged to form links with leading 
international research groups. For instance, the 13 centres above have formed a 
co-operative venture with counterpart laboratories of the CNRS in France (agreed during 
President Roh Tae Woo's state visit to France in December 1989). It is hoped that Korean 
firms will contribute financially to the centres. In some cases firms have already given 
financial support. 
1.1.8. GOVERNMENT FUNDED R&D INSTITUTES (Gfls) 
- In Korea GFis are an alternative to the universities 
KIST (Korean Institute of Science and Technology) the first GFI was established in 1966 
under a new Ministry of Science and Technology, which had a remit to build up the S&T 
infrastructure of the Korean economy. The mission of KIST was to generate a base for 
Korea in S& T and to provide vital services to industry. KIST became the first Korean S& T 
institute to attract back engineers and scientists from the US and other countries. 
Ten or so GFis were set up during the 1970s. Their aim was to create critical mass in a 
wide range of technologies vital for industrial progress. There are now 22 GFis (see Part 
3). The Ministry of S&T supports many of the GFis. However, other ministries are also 
actively involved in funding and deciding research agendas. For instance, the Ministry of 
Communications is involved with the Electronics and Telecommunications Research 
Institute; the Ministry of Energy and Resources are closely linked to the Korean Atomic 
Energy Research Institute and so on. 
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Architects of the GF! system in Korea argue that they needed to set up the GFis to 
circumvent the university establishment. They argue that Universities in Korea saw 
themselves as "time honoured institutions" with little regard for industry or commerce. 
Undoubtedly, the GFis took a lead role in S& T in the 1970s. There are significant and 
impressive cases of GFI-industry collaboration leading to high technology market entry. 
Among the most well known are the semiconductor DRAM project and the TDX 
telecommunications exchange project, both sponsored by the Ministry of S& T under the 
Electronic and Telecommunications Research Institute. 
Given their aim of supporting industry, the GFis have worked mainly in the field of applied 
(advanced and not so advanced) research rather than basic research or science. 
- Some criticise the GFis for lacking industry relevance 
Organisations such as KIST carried out consultancy for industry from the early stages. 
However, many in industry and ministries other than the Ministry of Science and 
Technology claim that KIST and other GFis have not linked well with industry. Nor, they 
argue, have GFis played a major role in supporting the Chaebol in their industrial activities. 
This has led the government to encourage more GFI-industry collaboration in S& T since the 
early 1980s. For instance, the Ministry of Trade and Industry has recently set up its own 
major R&D institute (the Korean Advanced Institute of Technology) specifically to bridge 
the gap between S& T and industrial needs. 
Links between some GFis and industry were certainly poor to begin with. In part this was 
because of the non-industrial research orientation of many of the GFis. GFI personnel 
tended to be drawn from the academic sector and judgement on project success (and 
promotion) was often based on publications rather than industry relevance. 
There may be other reasons for a lack of synergy between many of the GFis and the large 
conglomerates in the past. First, because firms were mostly involved in licencing 
technology from abroad, rather than generating technology locally and fostering local 
sources, there may have been a lack of demand from industry during the 1970s and early 
1980s. The outward orientation of the Chaebol (at least to some extent) may have left the 
GFis working in an industrial vacuum. 
Second, as the large firms set up their own research laboratories, they may be inclined to 
belittle the efforts of "rivals". To some extent industrial criticism of the GFis may be a 
version of the "not invented here" syndrome. 
In the latter half of the 1980s, firm-GFI links have improved. This is due, in part, to firms' 
attempts to source technology locally. Also, the new R&D laboratories of firms have more 
in common with the GFis (despite rivalry) than they had with production units, prior to the 
major R&D investments of firms. In the future more interaction with industry is expected 
as the Chaebol's R&D programmes develop. 
- But few would question the importance of the GFis to Korean S& T 
Despite criticisms of lacking industry relevance, few would argue that the GFis have not 
played a critically important part in the S& T development of Korea. They have provided 
the economy with a research base to build upon in the future and the personnel to support 
R&D projects both in industry and outside. Organisations such as KIST began a "reverse 
brain drain" attracting back many leading scientists and engineers to Korea, particularly 
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from the US. For instance, the President of the Korean Aerospace Institute (created in 
1989) was hired back from the US. 
By helping to fill the S&T vaccuum left by the Chaebol and the universities, the GFis have 
proved extremely valuable to Korea. The GFis gathered and disseminated technical 
information. They created a substantial pool of concentrated R&D and engineering 
resources. 
Now the economy is poised to deepen its R&D base, the need for domestic research 
capabilities is becoming increasingly important to industry. For the domestic S& T base, the 
GFis are likely to become still more important in the future. 
- As industry invests, GFis are searching for a new role 
As firms move into the applied R&D area, the GFis are finding it necessary to review their 
objectives. In the future, tasks closely related to industry such as applied product and 
process development and technological trouble shooting will increasingly be performed by 
firms. R&D activities which are on the critical path of industrial development will be 
integrated into the infrastructure of the conglomerates. 
The GFis can be expected to shift gradually away from R&D directly related to industrial 
innovation into more generic, basic and experimental R&D. In order to move into more 
basic research, the older GFis will face a difficult adjustment process. The management, 
evaluation and execution of basic research requires different skills than that required of 
industrial R&D. For instance, outputs cannot be evaluated simply in terms of products, 
processes and prototypes. The time scales involved in basic research are often much 
longer than those relevant to applied work. Project managers used to dealing in the world 
of industry related research may find their skills less relevant to generic work. The same 
problem applies to engineers. 
The likelihood is that as the overall base of R&D expands, there will be room for the 
existing GFI activities as well as the new research. Rather than displacing the base of 
applied R&D, new generic research projects will be added to the portfolios of GFI groups, 
softening the adjustment process. However, it is likely that some groups will find their own 
work redundant as industry moves into the R&D domain. 
1.1.9. S& T DECISION-MAKING IN KOREA 
-The Ministry of Science and Technology 
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) has been the main decision making body 
in S& T for the past 20 years or so. MOST provides the funding for many of the GFis and 
takes a active part in the direction of their work. 
Although MOST is a key S&T institution within Korea, MOST has been too weak politically 
to achieve its objectives alone. Strong support for S& T over the past 20 years or so has 
been given by successive Presidents of Korea. 
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-The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) is a more powerful ministry than MOST. The MTI 
have recently taken a strong interest in technology. As the MTI's role of industrial 
targetting and import protection has diminished during the 1980s, the Ministry has become 
more active in promoting high technology and providing pre-competitive R&D support for 
large and small firms. The MTI, for instance, recently set up its own research and teaching 
body to promote the development of industrial technology (see above). 
There is rivalry between MOST and MTI, particularly as the MTI shifts into the domain of 
industrial technology support and bridge building between S& T and industry. 
- The Economic Planning Board 
The Economic Planning Board (EPB) sits above the MTI, MOST and other ministries 
including the Ministry of Finance. It decides upon and allocates budgets and is extremely 
powerful in many fields, including technology and economy. (The Minister in charge of the 
EPB is also the deputy Prime Minister). 
- S& T at the presidential and ministerial levels 
Any high-level discussions on EC collaboration in S& T should begin with MOST but also 
take place with other ministries such as MTI and the EPB. Presidential advisers should be 
involved where appropriate. 
In addition, ministries with special responsibilities (e.g. Communications, Energy and 
Environment) should be closely involved with any projects which include their areas. 
Typically, they allocate budgets for the research institutes in their fields and have a strong 
influence on policy direction. 
The President is involved in S& T through the Presidential Blue House. Major policy 
decisions which affect S& T are taken by presidential advisers or presidential secretaries. 
The Economic Adviser is a key person in the area of S& T. 
- Special S& T committees 
There are a number of committees and task forces concerned with international 
collaboration in S& T. Between them, they have direct access to several ministers and the 
President of Korea. 
Among the most important is the First International Committee on International 
Co-operation, connected to the Department of International Co-operation of KOSEF (Korea 
Science and Engineering Foundation). This committee was set up in 1989. It has a 
number of high level individuals working on various aspects of EC-Korean collaboration in 
S&T. The committee is due to report by the end of October 1990. 
MOST have a task force working on EC-Korean collaboration. This was formed in February 
1990. It has 12 groups, one of which is solely concerned with S& T. This was organised 
by the EPB and will report to the Prime Minister. 
The Presidential Commission on the 21st Century, established in June 1989 (due to finish 
in May 1994) has direct access to the President. One of its four major concerns is the 
Page 16 - Sast Project 1 Report on Korea 
Strategic Review 
development of Korean S&T. The Commission will advise on energy, IT, environment, 
international links and many other S& T issues. 
Members of the various S& T committees interviewed during this study were open and frank 
(often very positive) about the prospects for EC-Korean collaboration. They are a good 
source of information and will be influential in future EC-Korean S& T links. 
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1.2. IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN-KOREAN COLLABORATION 
1.2.1. BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION 
Serious barriers to collaboration must be addressed prior to fruitful long-term relations in 
S&T between Korea and the Community. From the Community perspective (e.g. DGI), 
although limited collaboration could bring benefits in some specific cases, wide ranging 
co-operation in S& T runs the danger of one-way technology transfer to Korea combined 
with insufficient IPR protection. 
Three specific areas of EC concern are: (1 1 the protection of IPR rights; (21 restrictions on 
foreign investment; and (3) access to Korean markets. 
As far as IPR is concerned, discrimination against the Community vis-a-vis the US is a 
matter of considerable concern. To date, negotiations with the Korean authorities have 
failed to reach a conclusion satisfactory to the EC. Transitional arrangements in favour of 
the US seriously disadvantage Community interests in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, 
cosmetics, agrochemicals, semiconductors, printed materials, computer software and sound 
recordings and other sectors requiring protection of patents or copyrights. 
Regarding foreign investment, more than twenty percent of industrial categories remain 
prohibited or restricted. Community investors also face serious financial problems due to 
limits on the transfer of equity capital, local loan facilities and Won funding. In joint 
ventures, foreign partners risk being unable to subscribe to their equity share whenever 
capital has to be increased. This can occur as a result of Korean legislation concerning the 
public issue of shares and/or administrative pressures. Also, Korean land acquisition 
requirements and complex and detailed tax investigations into foreign investors act as 
barriers to foreign investment. 
Regarding access to Korean markets, high import duties, quantitative restnct1ons, tax 
disrimination against imported products, protectionist safety standards and delays in 
customs clearance are among the difficulties faced by EC companies. From the perspective 
of some EC officials, the problems facing Community firms' cast doubt on the willingness 
of the Korean authorities to really open the domestic market to foreign goods and services' 
(Communication from Directorate-General I, 21 November 90, Number 132383). 
Accordingly, many EC officials are reluctant to encourage wide-ranging S& T co-operation. 
In areas such as semiconductors and pharmaceuticals, increased co-operation inS& T could 
run the risk of one-way technology transfer from the EC to Korea. Except in specific cases 
of clear and unequivocal net benefit to the community, the principle of mutual benefit may 
well be unattainable, particularly in near-to-market co-operation. 
1.2.2. THE IMPASSE OVER EC-KOREAN S&T CO-OPERATION 
At the present time there is an impasse in the issue of EC-Korean S& T co-operation. Many 
Koreans wish to collaborate, but the EC is unwilling given the dangers of collaboration. 
Only in specific areas of clear and unequivocal net benefit to the EC, is the EC keen to 
collaborate in S& T. However, this criterion rules out many of the close-to-market sectors 
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in which Korea is keen to co-operate and already boasts strong capabilities: consumer 
electronics, telecommunications, semiconductors and so on (see Annexes 2, 3 and 4). In 
these areas uncertainty and risk prevail and the problems of IPR and market access loom 
large. 
The position of the Commission in near-to-market technology areas is understandable. 
However, it casts doubt on Commission's willingness to co-operate with Korea in 
pre-competitive S&T and areas such as high definition TV standards (see Annex 4). 
The danger of this impasse is that co-operation will continue between Korean firms and 
S& T agencies and their counterparts in Japan and the US, leaving the EC at a 
disadvantage. In addition, Korea will continue to form agreements with individual EC 
member states and European firms, as is currently the Korean practise, regardless of the 
Community position on IPR and market access (see sections 11.2.3.2 and Annexes 2, 3 and 
4). 
In so far as the Commission could play a role in stimulating Korean-EC links, the impasse 
suggests that the S&T "boat" is likely to be missed (see section 1.2.11 below). As a 
consequence, Europe is unlikely to improve its position vis a vis Japan and the US in Korea, 
despite the current Korean desire to seek additional international sources of S& T. 
1.2.3. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF LONG-TERM "COMPLEMENTARY 
COLLABORATION" IN S&T 
In the light of the ongoing liberalisation problems, it is unlikely that extensive S& T 
collaboration will proceed in the short-term. This is unfortunate for both parties, as the 
potential benefits of wide-ranging co-operation could be considerable both to Korea and to 
the Community. 
Korea is set for a major expansion of its S& T base in the 1990s. If problems of market 
liberalisation can be overcome and European investors are able to secure IPR protection and 
market access, then it may be possible for EC-Korean co-operation in S& T to work to the 
benefit of both parties through the principle of complementary collaboration. 
During discussions with Korean officials, the following arguments for complementary 
collaboration were put forward. 
- Collaboration could benefit EC and Korean firms 
Korea now boasts significant strengths in manufacturing process and product technology, 
yet is weak in vital areas of basic and applied research. Conversely, in some areas the EC 
is relatively weak in manufacturing and product technology, but strong in basic and applied 
research. It follows that with careful matching, both parties could benefit from each other 
in S& T co-operation. 
For instance, in exchange for advanced process or standards technology a Korean producer 
could transfer leading-edge manufacturing technology to a European firm. This could take 
place in a joint R&D venture, a strategic partnership arrangement or in a jointly owned 
company. Decisions could then be made as to how the joint Korean-European venture 
might address both European, Korean, South East Asian, US and other markets. 
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According to some Korean industrialists, this type of collaboration on the basis of 
complementary technological strengths and weaknesses could work to the long-term 
economic benefit of both parties. 
- Collaboration could open up new markets 
Through strategic partnerships, EC firms could enable Korean companies to compete more 
effectively in Europe from within EC national boundaries. Korean firms would gain access 
to large and growing EC markets (and technology). Europe could gain from increased 
employment and, in the longer term, the integration of Korean multinationals into the 
industrial infrastructure of the EC. 
Similarly, strategic partnerships within Korea could enable EC firms to access the large and 
rapidly growing Korean market, more effectively than direct foreign investment. In addition, 
a foothold in Korea could enable access to other Pacific Basin markets. A strong local 
presence in the Pacific Basin region is a pre-requisite for continued competitive success, 
particularly in high technology sectors. 
Korea is a major competitor within the Pacific Basin and has experience of manufacturing 
and producing high technology goods within East Asia as a whole. Korea could provide a 
window by which EC firms could access the East Asian market, East Asian manufacturing 
and product technology, low cost components and low cost labour. Although wage costs 
have risen in Korea, they remain substantially lower than EC wage costs. In addition, 
Korean firms have considerable experience in accessing low cost labour in neighbouring 
economies such as China. 
Korea's S& T strengths and weaknesses and its current need to adjust suggest it could be 
a "natural partner" for the EC within the Pacific Basin region. 
Limited versions of such complementary collaborations already exist on the part of 
European firms. For instance, the UK microcomputer maker AMSTRAD manufactures 
personal computers within Korea for sale mainly within the EC market. Ericsson of Sweden 
has formed a successful manufacturing joint venture with OPC in telecommunications. 
Similarly, Hewlett Packard of the US has formed a strategic partnership with Samsung in 
computing technology. 
If IPR and market access problems can be overcome, then in order to access the Pacific 
Basin market the EC may wish to promote such ventures in the future. 
Although other major economies within South East Asia may also desire to collaborate with 
the EC, few outside Japan boast such well developed manufacturing, product and global 
marketing capabilities. 
- Collaboration could benefit academic research 
During the study, an idea for exploration was put forward by a senior representative of the 
academic sector. He noted that some European universities currently suffer from financial 
constraints and an ageing population of researchers. In some S& T fields it is difficult for 
experienced, senior project leaders to recruit young able post-doctoral researchers. 
In Korea the situation is reversed in many areas. There are very few world class research 
laboratories with senior project leaders. Conversely, Korea boasts a large population of 
young, inexperienced but highly enthusiastic researchers. 
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A possible model of complementary collaboration would be for groups of Korean 
researchers to engage in research work within European universities, funded from the 
Korean side. This would alleviate problems faced by both parties and could facilitate good 
technology links and personal contacts which could benefit both parties in the long-run. 
1.2.4. WHY SHOULD KOREA COllABORATE ? 
Undoubtedly, the EC is a promising source of (a) technology and (b) new markets for 
Korean firms. At the present time Korea is at the preliminary stages of diversifying its 
international sources of technology. The EC is seen as a 'first best' option for collaboration 
outside US and Japan. Indeed, Korea has a pressing need to expand its S&T sources, as 
the difficulties with Japan and the US demonstrate. 
The EC science and research base is viewed as being very strong overall. In some areas 
(e.g. telecommunications and pharmaceuticals) EC industrial technology is leading edge. 
EC collaborative programmes have stimulated a great deal of interest from Korea (in 
electronics, energy and so on). EC programmes such as ESPRIT I and II and RACE have 
placed Europe on the technological map and made the region very attractive to Korea as 
a source of S& T. 
The EC may have lessons to offer Korea in many areas. These include: 
- basic S& T capabilities in many specific fields 
- setting up and running basic research laboratories 
- project level technology assessment and evaluation methods 
- effective policies for small and medium enterprises 
- energy use and conservation 
- information technology standards (e.g. software and HDTVl 
- senior project management experience at the academic level. 
However, as noted earlier, in areas such as telecommunications there are major difficulties 
over access to Korean markets for EC firms. Also, as far as pharmaceuticals are 
concerned, there is discriminatory treatment in the field of intellectual property protection. 
1.2.5. WHY SHOULD THE EC COllABORATE ? 
If the trade, right of establishment and IPR difficulties could be resolved, then there could 
be attractive benefits for the EC in relation to extending S& T and industrial collaboration 
with Korea. 
Summarising the potential benefits for EC collaboration: 
- Korea could provide a "window of opportunity" for the EC in the Pacific Basin, 
providing EC firms with access to: 
- East Asian markets 
-low cost labour (particularly in neighbouring economies in which Korean firms have 
investments) 
- low cost components 
Sast Project 1 Report on Korea - Page 21 
Strateg1c Rev1ew 
- Korea boasts very significant manufacturing capabilities which could possibly be 
transferred to EC firms in exchange for R&D and standards technology 
- the EC needs to compete in the Pacific Basin and the US to remain competitive in the 
1990s - Korea could be an appropriate collaboration partner 
- S& T collaboration at the academic level could benefit European universities, through 
the infusion of project funds and young researchers 
- S& T co-operation at the pre-competitive level (academic, industry and government 
research laboratory) would serve to improve relations between both groups and set 
up valuable personal contacts vital for future co-operation. 
Some of the above arguments were put forward by Korean interviewees as reasons for the 
EC to consider wide-ranging S& T co-operation. The potential appears to be substantial and 
certainly warrants detailed exploration. 
1.2.6. DANGERS OF THE "HOllOW" CORPORATION VERSUS 
LEARNING FROM COMPETITORS 
Forward-looking EC firms such as Thomson of France, believe that learning from 
competitors is essential to enter new markets such as advanced consumer electronics. In 
the case of video cassette recorders, for instance, Thomson had no capability in the early 
1980s. The company began by distributing Japanese products. It then entered into 
technology transfer agreements with the Japanese firm JVC. 
Following this, Thomsom was able to build up its own in-house production capacity. By 
1990 Thomson had become a globally respected supplier of video cassette recorders, with 
a 50-50 venture with JVC in Berlin and a plant in Singapore. The Singapore plant has the 
capacity to produce one million sets per annum based on Thomson's proprietary 
technology. 
As the President of Thomson argues, a learning strategy towards South East Asian and 
other market leaders is vital for firms wishing to catch up in areas such as consumer 
electronics. Thomson's strategy has relevance to Korean collaboration. Where Korean firms 
are market leaders (e.g. in some areas of consumer electronics), then collaboration in 
technology arrangements could benefit European firms. 
Thomson's view also has relevance to EC concerns expressed to SRA about the prospect 
of production shifting outside national and/or firm boundaries (sometimes called the 
'hollowing' of the corporation). Thomson believes that a flexible, global strategy is essential 
for firms wishing to remain at the forefront of consumer electronics, semiconductors and 
other high technology areas. As Gomez of Thomson puts it: 
'We must have an organisation that can install and move the links of the business chain to 
any part of the world. Ten years ago, that meant moving assembly and production to 
low-cost areas such as Malaysia and Taiwan. Now it also means moving marketing and 
R&D to places like Singapore. Years from now, the wisest decision might be to bring 
production plants back to Europe and move the headquarters wherever the brightest, most 
hardworking people are.' 
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(Interview: Harvard Business Review May-June 1990, p135} 
In this interpretation of modern industrial"best practice", the location of production outside 
national boundaries or outside the innovating firm does not reflect a hollowing of the 
corporation. On the contrary, the firm is constantly adjusting to competitive requirements 
across the value-added chain through from research to production to marketing. As such, 
the firm is constantly learning and augmenting its core capabilities which, in turn, is vital 
for long-term growth, profitability and survival. 
The need for firms such as Thomson is therefore to develop the organisational capabilities 
and flexibility to meet global technology and market requirements, from where it is most 
appropriate to do so. In this context, Korean firms have demonstrated a formidable 
capability in several market areas, to the point where Japan has begun to restrict flows of 
technology. It is conceivable therefore that European firms could benefit from selective 
engagement in collaborative ventures with Korean companies. 
1.2.7. ADDITIONAL BARRIERS TO CO-OPERATION 
- Close ties with Japan 
In addition to the barriers discussed in section 1.2.1, further barriers mitigate against 
co-operation. Important structural barriers noted by Korean officials included the close, 
traditional links which Korea enjoys with Japan and the US. Most Koreans are relatively 
unfamiliar with European culture, business methods, non-English languages and so on. 
Despite the current reluctance of Japan to transfer strategic technologies, Japan is still 
viewed as the primary source of technology. 
If the EC attempted to strengthen S& T relations with Korea, EC firms would probably face 
a stepping up of competition from Japan, especially if EC-Korean relations prove successful. 
Japan would seek to retain its hegemony over technology transfer to Korea. 
The regional proximity of Japan puts Europe at a disadvantage, as do the long standing 
links between the two countries. In part, these factors explain the relatively weak presence 
of European firms within Korea. 
Also, Japanese individuals and firms are likely to continue to supply Korea with technology 
through informal sources of technology (e.g. retired Japanese engineers and so-called 
"moonlighters" from large Japanese firms who fly from Japan to Korea during weekends 
to provide technical assistance}. 
- Strong links with the US 
Similarly, the US continues with close technology and business ties and benefits from a 
greater familiarity with Korean technology and business practices. Many leading 
researchers and managers in Korea have been trained in US universities (and US firms in 
some cases) and retain close personal connections with the US. Political ties with the US 
are also strong. 
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- Perceptions of European technology strengths and weaknesses 
In certain technology areas some Koreans view the EC in second or third place behind 
Japan and the US. In several core electronics fields (for instance, computing, software and 
semiconductors) the EC tends to be ranked second or third after Japan and the US. 
-The "transparency problem" 
A final difficulty cited by many senior Korean officials is the "transparency problem". The 
transparency problem refers to the lack of visibility on the part of Koreans of the EC' s rules, 
procedures and contact points for collaboration. First, there is a low degree of awareness 
and understanding in Korea of the "EC" entity, as opposed to individual European countries. 
Second, there is little understanding of the objectives and nature of EC S& T programmes. 
Koreans are not sure: 
(a) if they are allowed to collaborate in EC programmes 
(b) in which circumstances it is appropriate to collaborate with the EC, as opposed to 
individual nation states 
(c) which procedures to follow to apply for programme entry 
(d) which departments, groups or individuals within the EC to 
communicate with on issues of collaboration. 
- Other difficulties 
Other problems mentioned by Korean interviewees included: 
- the difficulties of some Korean firms in starting up factories within the EC 
- the relatively high cost of European labour 
- Korean difficulties in assessing technological capabilities in European universities, 
government laboratories and firms 
- poorly developed bargaining skills on both sides. 
1.2.8. MEASURES TO IMPROVE S& T EC-KOREA CO-OPERATION 
From an EC perspective, wide-ranging EC-Korean S& T co-operation can only proceed with 
a resolution, or satisfactory progress towards a resolution of the market access, capital and 
IPR problems discussed in section 1.2.1. Such progress can only be achieved through 
negotiation between the appropriate EC and Korean agencies and relevant political 
pressures which may be applied by the EC. 
If satisfactory progress towards IPR and other difficulties can be reached, then to enable 
wide-ranging S& T co-operation additional measures would need to be taken to resolve the 
"second order", structural, cultural and communication difficulties discussed in section 
1.2.7. 
During the Korean field research, S& T practitioners put forward the following ideas for 
overcoming the second order difficulties: 
- ministerial level agreement or statement of S& T intent 
- Korean-EC working parties from industry, academia and government laboratories 
could be set up to 
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- identify specific EC-Korean projects for collaboration 
- EC-Korean government level supporting mechanisms for collaboration 
- dissemination of information on collaboration procedures and 
- schemes to assist firms and universities to collaborate. 
From the Korean perspective, prior to these actions, decisions would need to be taken by 
the Commission on: (a) whether Korean firms, government institutes and universities are 
eligible to participate in EC programmes; {b) whether Korean firms operating within Europe 
(or within Korea) may engage in EC programmes; (c) which activities should be discharged 
by the Commission as opposed to EC member states. 
1.2.9. THE ROLE OF "NON-THREATENING" PROJECTS 
It may be decided by the Commission, that despite EC concerns over market liberalisation 
and so on, some limited co-operatidn in "non-threatening" areas of S&T could be to the 
unequivocal benefit of EC companies and S& T agencies. 
For instance, both parties stand to gain from collaboration in environmental, health and 
energy issues. Co-operation in high definition television (HDTV) standards could also benefit 
the EC by widening the potential market for the European HDTVs (although the prospects 
for co-operation appear poor from the Korean perspective, see section 1.2.11 ). 
If such collaborations were successful they could build up improved links between the EC 
and Korea and lead to a stronger presence of EC enterprise in Korea in the future. 
1.2.10. KOREAN SUGGESTIONS FOR S&T CO-OPERATION 
Korean officials suggested many specific fields for collaboration with the EC during the 
interview programme: 
- energy; nuclear power - nuclear waste management - fuel cycle technology -
nuclear safety -alternative energy source (water/ocean) 
- energy conservation technology (distributed heating, cold generators) 
- offshore oil development - gas combustion technology - natural gas liquification -
technology for submerged cables - clean coal technology - new and renewable 
resources 
- biotechnology 
- oceanology 
-environment, pollution (air and water) e.g. acid rain 
- medical research 
- housing/construction 
- information technology (e.g.semiconductors, software and HDTV) 
- policy research for each of the above. 
Detailed recommendations on specific areas of collaboration and methods of collaboration 
need to be built up carefully and take fully into account EC concerns over market access, 
IPR and other difficulties. 
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In addition, the views and requirements of EC industry need to be assessed prior to any 
decisions. Where areas are considered to be of mutual benefit, then S& T co-operation 
could begin via: exchanges of information, the establishment of EC-Korean communication 
channels in S& T, exchanges of engineers and scientists and so on. 
Assuming some progress towards the resolution of IPR and other difficulties in the future, 
it may be possible to establish a national scheme within Korea to agree terms and 
conditions of collaboration with the EC. Within an agreed EC-Korean S& T procedure, 
collaboration could occur more easily between firms, research laboratories and universities. 
Such a procedure might also promote mutually beneficial co-operation in the private sector, 
independent of EC programmes. 
1.2.11. DANGERS OF "MISSING THE BOAT": LESSONS FROM THE 
CASE STUDIES 
At the present time the EC is a distant third after Japan and the US in terms of Korean 
activity in science, technology, industry, trade and investment. Given Korea's current 
needs and the EC's competences in S&T, there is a major new opportunity for the EC to 
strengthen its S&T and industrial links with Korea. 
However, the current impasse over market access, IPR and other matters threatens to 
prevent such links from being developed with the support of the Community. In so far as 
the Community could assist firms and EC S& T agencies in co-operating with Korea, this 
implies that the S& T "boat" may be missed. 
The case study material in Annexes 2, 3 and 4, lend some support to the view that Japan 
and the US will continue to strengthen their positions in Korea, relative to the EC, despite 
the tightening up of technology transfer on the part of Japanese companies. 
1.2.12. HIGH DEFINITION TELEVISION (HDTV) STANDARDS (ANNEX 4) 
Major decisions are currently being taken by Korean companies regarding HDTV. 
Opportunities could exist for European firms to share standards technology with Korean 
firms and benefit from Korea's competences in the mass manufacture of TV sets. For 
example, one or more European firms could form a jointly-owned venture with a major 
Korean manufacturer - an idea suggested by a Korean Chaebol during the field research. 
However, the view in Korea that the EC is not "generous" with its technology or its 
markets (e.g. Jun and Kim, 1989) may lead to Korea adopting the Japanese or US 
standard, rather than the EC one. Korean firms have not yet ruled out any particular 
standard, but most of the running has been made by Japan and the US, rather than the EC. 
From the Commission's point of view, the constant emphasis on IPR and market access 
problems, coupled with the negative perspective by some Koreans over EC "generosity", 
could work against a possible EC-Korean link up. 
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1.2.13. TElECOMMUNICATIONS (ANNEX 3) 
Apart from Alcatel of France, most EC firms are not major players in the Korean 
telecommunications market. As Korea attempts to upgrade its telecommunications 
network, it is likely that some liberalisation of services will take place, particularly in the 
areas of business communications, value-added networks and mobile communications. 
Korea may have to purchase leading edge technology and equipment which they cannot 
produce locally. 
Several European firms could potentially supply equipment and technology under joint 
venture arrangements. Currently, Alcatel is the main EC firm engaged in technology 
transfer to Korea. US and Japanese firms are keen to increase their activities within Korea 
(as is Ericsson of Sweden). 
IPR and market access problems do not appear to act as barriers to technology transfer to 
Korea in near-to-market technology activities such as telecommunications. Problems 
appear to be resolved by the firms engaged in joint ventures with Korean companies. 
1.2.14. SEMICONDUCTORS (ANNEX 2) 
In semiconductors, as in other areas of electronics, Korea is able to access world class 
technology, mainly through partnerships with Japanese and US companies. The major 
1989 Goldstar-Hitachi venture in one megabit DRAM technology shows that even under 
the current climate of Japanese suspicion of Korean companies, some Japanese firms 
believe there are significant commercial advantages to be gained from co-operation with 
Korea. 
In more complex areas, such as application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), Korean 
firms are managing to access design, materials and capital goods technology from joint 
ventures with US, Japanese and in some cases, European firms. 
1.2.15. GENERAl lESSONS IN ElECTRONICS 
Despite Korea's record on market access, IPR and so on, Korean firms appear to be 
accessing leading edge electronics technology from the Japanese and US market leaders 
and, in some cases, European firms. The motivation on the part of foreign companies is 
commercial. Korea is a large and expanding market for technology, components, 
consultancy services and so on. IPR and other problems appear to be resolved at the firm 
level, within partnerships. 
The weak presence of EC firms within Korea appears to be a result of strong historical and 
cultural links with Japanese and US firms, rather than IPR and market access problems. 
If the current impasse over IPR deters commercial ventures between EC and Korean 
companies, this will add to Japanese and US advantage in Korea. 
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11.1. - THE ECONOMY 
11.2. -THE S&T SYSTEM 

Decision Base 
11.1. THE ECONOMY 
This section provides data on some of the most important features of the Korean economy, 
beginning with the transformation from an agricultural to an industrial economy, and then 
focusing on structural changes and challenges facing Korea in the 1980s. Major points of 
interest include: Korea's economic performance during the 1980s, the 1989 slowdown in 
growth, trends in outward and inward investment, the activities of the Chaebol, moves 
towards liberalisation, and sectoral and regional trading patterns. 
11.1.1. HISTORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY 
- Korea's industrial take-off began in the 1960s 
Table 1 outlines the evolution of Korea's industrial development, from the early 
import-substitution of light industries in the 1 960s, to the development of heavy industries 
in the 1970s. During the 1980s the emphasis has moved onto technology-intensive 
sectors. 
The corresponding strategies for S& T are also outlined in Table 1. Here the emphasis 
shifted from promoting foreign technology imports in the 1960s, to supporting 
industrial-related research in the 1970s, to building successful national R&D projects in high 
technology in the 1980s. 
- Korea was rapidly transformed from an agricultural to a manufacturing economy 
Up until the early 1960s, Korea was essentially an agricultural economy. As Table 2 
shows, since the 1960s the share of manufacturing in GOP increased from 13.5% to 
31.6%. Conversely, the share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries fell from 38.7% to 
1 0.8%. Social overhead expenditures increased steadily to support Korea's 
industrialisation. 
Government policies were implemented through successive Five Year Plans which began 
in the early 1 960s. During the 1 960s, Korean policies supported industries such as 
cement, oil refining and fertilisers. The government took a leading part in building up basic 
infrastructures such as roads, railways and electriCity. 
During the 1970s, policies gave support to export promotion development of labour 
intensive light industries such as textiles, plywood and footware. 
Sast Project 1 Report on Korea - Page 31 
Decision Base 
TABLE 1 ; Transformation of the Korean economy 1960s to 1990s 
Period Industrialisation Science & Technology 
1960s Develop import-substituting Strengthen S& T education 
industry 
Expand export-oriented light Deepen S& T infrastructure 
industries 
Support producer goods industries Promote foreign technology 
importation 
1970s Expand heavy and chemical Expand technical training 
industries 
Shift emphasis from inward capital Improve institutional mechanisms 
flow to technology import for adapting imported technology 
Strengthen export-oriented industry Promote research applicable to 
competitiveness industrial needs 
1980s Transform industrial structure to Develop and acquire top-level 
one of comparative advantage scientists and engineers 
Expand technology-intensive Perform national R&D projects more 
industry efficiently 
Encourage manpower development Promote industries' technology 
& improve productivity development 
1990s Adjust industrial structure and Develop basic science, high 
improve productivity technology and social welfare 
technology 
Promote balanced development Expand science and technology 
resources and promote efficiency 
Source : Ministry of Science and Technology (1990) p15 
TABLE 2 : Industrial structure 1960s to 1980s (Unit: % of GOP} 
1961 1971 1981 1988 
Economic field 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries 38.7 27.0 18.0 10.8 
Mining and manufacturing 15.4 22.3 30.9 32.4 
(manufacturing) 13.5 21.0 29.5 31.6 
Social overhead capital 9.1 13.3 16.5 20.4 
Other services 36.8 37.3 34.6 36.4 
Source : Economic Planning Board, cited 1n Ministry of Sc1ence and Technology ( 1990) p 12 
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- Like other economies, Korea has faced economic difficulties 
It would be wrong to suggest that Korea made an effortless transition from lower to higher 
"stages of production". For instance, in 1979 and 1980 the economy faced major 
difficulties with the increase in oil prices and the worldwide recession. In 1980, these 
problems, coupled with an extremely poor rice harvest, forced the economy into a year of 
negative growth. A slow recovery began in 1981, but until 1984 the economy still 
suffered from the recession. 
Inflation also bedevilled the economy from time to time. In 1981 the inflation rate reached 
21.3% (Ministry of Science and Technology, 1990, p9). The rate fell back to 7.3% in 
1982 and continued to fall to around 2-3% unti11985. In late 1987 inflation reached more 
than 8% (see Table 3). Some estimates put the current rate of inflation at around 12% per 
annum (e.g. Financial Times, May 16, 1990, piii). 
- The 1980s witnessed a major shift from light to heavy industry 
Since the mid 1970s and into the 1 980s, a series of large scale investment projects were 
undertaken in the steel, shipbuilding, petrochemical and machinery industries. These 
resulted in a declining share of light industry in GOP and an increase in areas such as 
machinery, primary metals and chemicals. 
TABLE 3 : Origins of GOP (1982 and 1988) - % of total at 
market prices 
1982 1988 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 14.6 10.8 
Mining and quarrying 1.5 0.7 
Manufacturing 28.3 31.6 
Electricity, gas, water 2.2 2.8 
Construction 8.0 8.1 
Trade, restaurants, hotels 13.1 12.3 
Transport, storage, communications 8.7 7.3 
Financial, business services 8.4 13.2 
Government services 8.0 7.9 
GOP at factor, cost, including others 100.0 100.0 
Source : Elaboration of data in EIU (1 9891 and EIU (1 990) 
Table 3 compares the main components of GOP for 1982 and 1988. It emphasises the 
increasing importance of manufacturing as well as financial and business services, the latter 
having overtaken agriculture as a source of GOP. 
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11.1.2. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE 1980s 
- Since 1985 growth has been extremely rapid 
Korea is nearing the end of its third decade of sustained economic growth. In the very 
recent period, rates of growth, exports and income per capita have exceeded those of 
almost all other countries. During the period 1986 to 1988, economic growth averaged 
around 12.6% per year. Export volumes grew at an astonishing 16.5% per annum. 
Measured in terms of GNP per capita, income nearly doubled from US $2,194 in 1986 to 
$4,040 in 1988, raising Korea from low to middle income status in the world economy. 
After 1985 the current account deficit was transformed into a sustained and heavy surplus. 
- Growth was facilitated by the "three lows" 
Growth during the 1980s was the result of Korea's ability to exploit a favourable economic 
environment. Three frequently cited factors in Korea's 1980s' growth are: the low value 
of the currency; the low level of international oil prices; and low interest rates. 
However, under similar conditions most other economies failed to achieve growth rates 
approaching those of Korea. Much of the Korean success in GNP growth and exports was 
based on the aggressive risk-taking strategies of the large conglomerates which dominate 
the economy, coupled with the low wage rates paid to workers. 
TABLE 4 : Macroeconomic indicators 1985 to 1990 
1985 1986 
GDP current 80.8 93.4 
Won'OOObn 
Real GDP growth % 6.9 12.4 
Consumer price inti. % 2.5 2.3 
Exports FOB $bn 30.3 34.7 
Imports CIF $bn 31.1 31.6 
Current account bal $bn -0.9 4.7 
Reserves excl gold $bn 7.7 8.0 
Total extrnl debt $bn 46.7 44.5 
Exch. rate (av) W/$ 868.5 881.5 
(March 1 1990 exchange rate : Won 697 per US Dollar) 
• based on projection made in mid January 1990 
1987 
108.0 
11.8 
3.0 
47.3 
41.0 
9.9 
9.2 
35.5 
822.6 
• • refers to GNP not GDP (GNP calculation is slightly higher than GDP) 
Sources: EIU (1990) 
Financial Times, May 16, 1990 
Page 34 - Sast Project 1 Report on Korea 
1988 1989 1990* 
125.3 138.1 147.1 
11.3 5.5 6.5** 
7.1 5.2 6.8 
60.7 62.3 64.0 
51.8 61.3 63.2 
14.2 5.1 1.0 
20.8 22.5 -
31.1 29.4 -
731.5 671.5 -
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11.1.3. THE SLOW DOWN IN KOREAN GROWTH 
- Growth slowed dramatically in 1989 
As Table 4 shows, growth slowed down dramatically in 1989. GNP grew at less than half 
the rate of the previous three years. Estimates for 1990 show a similar performance to 
1989. The rapid growth of exports of 36% (1986 to 1987) and 28% (1987 to 1988) fell 
to just 3% (1988 to 1989). Export growth is projected to stay at roughly 3% in 1990 
(measured in dollar value). In volume terms exports actually fell by 7% in 1989, compared 
with a growth of 15% in 1988. 
The slow down in export growth forced the current account surplus down from $14.2bn 
in 1988 to $5.1 bn in 1989 (a fall from 11% of GNP to 3.6% of GNP). 
- Reasons for slow growth include the appreciation of the Won 
The steady appreciation of the Won against the US dollar and the Yen has reduced the 
competitiveness of Korean export goods. As the Won appreciated against the Yen, 
competition from Japan intensified. (Korean firms now compete with Japanese firms in 
more than 50% of their product exports). The aggregate competitive loss against Japan 
in the past two years amounted to 36% (through the exchange rate) and a further 20% or 
more through wage costs (Financial Times, May 16, 1990, pvii). 
- As well as industrial disputes 
TABLE 5 :Incidence of labour disputes 
Number of strikes Average duration 
1987 3749 5.4 days 
1988 1873 13.0 days 
1989 1616 
< 
18.00 days 
.. Source : Mmtstry of Labour (ctted m Fmanctal Ttmes, May 16, 1990) 
Widespread labour unrest produced significant disruptions in industrial output in 1 988 and 
1989. Hyundai union leaders (among others) were imprisoned during the strikes. Riot 
police clashed with workers in several industries, ranging from the shipbuilding industry to 
the state-run broadcasting network. 
The Korean Labour Institute calculates that production valued at Won 7 ,409bn (roughly 
$1 0.6bn) was lost due to strikes in 1988 and 1989. The Ministry of Labour cites labour 
disputes as both a cause of inflation and a reason for the loss in export competitiveness. 
The Ministry of Labour claims that labour disputes led to wage increases of 20% in 1989 
and a loss of seven million working days, amounting to an economic cost of $6.5bn (nearly 
4% of GNP). (Financial Times, May 16, 1990). 
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- And inflation 
Inflation has returned to Korea as a serious economic problem. In 1990 inflation was 
forecast to reach double figures - its highest level since 1981 (Financial Times, July 17, 
1990, p4). 
Since 1987, unit labour costs (taking into account productivity gains, currency changes and 
wage increases) in Korea increased by 43% between mid-1988 and mid-1989 - more 
rapidly than in any other Asian economy. 
From 1986 to 1989 unit labour costs in dollar terms rose by 100%, ending Korea's 
low-cost wage status (Financial Times, November 27, 1989, pi). 
The causes of inflation appear to be: (a) wage increases of more than 20% per annum 
since late 1987; (b) recent land speculation (e.g. land prices rose by 33% in 1989); and 
(c) property rents and property prices (both increased by 15% in 1989). 
- Key export sectors have suffered, but increased domestic demand has compensated 
Wage inflation, labour unrest and the appreciating Won have led to a declining performance 
of several key export sectors such as automobiles, steel, textiles and electronics in 1989 
and 1990. 
Motor vehicles exports fell by 40% in 1989 from 576,000 to 347,000 (a fall of 200,000 
for Hyundai alone) due to exchange rate adjustments, labour costs and strikes (EIU, 1990, 
p23). Strong growth in the domestic market compensated for the export losses (a 45.8% 
growth in 1989 to 763,308 vehicles). In 1990, Korean car producers expected to sell two 
thirds of their output on the domestic market (exports were around 60% of production in 
1989). 
In electronics, 1989 production increased by 1 0% over 1988, but exports increased by 
only 6.1% (compared with 40% in 1988). To compensate for this, domestic sales of 
consumer electronics increased by 25% in 1989, while industrial electronics sold in the 
domestic market rose by 42% in 1989. 
Increased domestic consumption, itself partly the result of wage increases over the past 
two years, softened the impact of falling export growth. Without the strong expansion of 
domestic consumption overall industrial output would have suffered far more severely. 
- Competition from low wage economies has also affected exports 
Labour-intensive industries such as apparel and textiles are suffering from a long-term 
structural decline, as lower cost developing countries undercut Korean exports. In textiles 
(the economy's largest employer and one of its largest export items). Korean exports rose 
by 9.2% to $15.4m in 1989, roughly half of the increase of the previous year. 
In the steel industry it is expected that imports will soon exceed exports, as the stronger 
Won has led consumers to look towards lower cost foreign products. 
- But some sectors are sustaining a good performance 
Some sectors are continuing to improve their export position. These include shipbuilding, 
footware and auto parts - the latter due to strong exports of cars during the period 1987 
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and 1988. Orders for more complex ships have kept order books healthy, especially in the 
early part of 1990 (EIU, 1990, p24). 
11.1.4. THE KOREAN "CRISIS" IN CONTEXT 
It should be pointed out that Korea's 1989 growth (greater than 6%) is much higher than 
that achieved by most other economies, developed or developing. The so-called Korean 
"crisis", frequently reported in the Korean media, exists only in relation to Korea's strong 
economic performance of the post-1985 period. Compared with most other economies, 
Korea remains healthy and the outlook for continued development is good. 
As a report from the International Monetary Fund puts it: "The present difficulties should 
not be allowed to overshadow the impressive expansion, unequalled elsewhere in the 
world, that has been achieved by Korea's dynamic economy since 1985. As a result of its 
accomplishments the Korean economy is in a strong position to face the challenges that 
lie ahead" (cited in Financial Times, November 27, 1989, pi). 
Indeed, very recent reports from the Korean Development Institute have revised growth 
figures for 1990 almost back to levels of the boom years of 1987 and 1988. The 
consensus for 1990 growth was between 8% and 9% in July 1990. Wage demands were 
forecast to slow to 10% or so in 1990, compared with 20% in 1989, while the number of 
industrial disputes also fell significantly in the first quarter of 1990. In 1990, demand 
continued to shift to the domestic economy, with construction and consumer goods 
consumption leading the growth. 
Although Korea's economic difficulties may not be intractable, as discussed below, Korea 
needs to make significant structural adjustments both in economic matters and in science 
and technology, to meet the new economic circumstances of the economy. Among the 
most pressing problems are the long-term appreciation of the Won, higher wage rates, 
increasing interest rates, and the need to upgrade the quality and technology of Korean 
manufactured goods. 
11.1.5. FOREIGN (INWARD) INVESTMENT TRENDS 
Table 6 presents foreign investment trends by major country for the periods 1962 to 1989 
and 1 987 to 1 989. The table demonstrates a large acceleration in the rate of direct foreign 
investment in the three year period 1987 to 1989. Around 46% of total accumulated 
investment in Korea occurred during these three years. 
Table 6 also illustrates the dominance of Japanese inward investment throughout Korea's 
industrialisation period. After Japan, the US is the next major investor. European countries 
come a very distant third, with West Germany and the UK slightly increasing their share of 
total investments in the last three years. 
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TABLE 6- Foreign investment trends by country. On approval basis, $'000s 
1987 1988 1989* 
projs value projs value projs value 
us 93 255,140 104 284,401 72 262,843 
Japan 207 493,899 177 696,244 99 383,035 
West 10 41 ,493 15 74,040 17 36,574 
Germany 
UK 6 48,329 8 21,781 7 39,191 
Totals 1962-1989 Totals 1987-1989 
projs value %** projs value % 
us 692 1,874,946 32.9 269 802,384 30.4 
Japan 1,876 3,425,295 60.2 483 1573,178 59.7 
West 93 215,855 3.8 42 152,107 5.8 
Germany 
UK 45 174,650 3.1 21 109,301 4.1 
Totals 5,690, 746 100.0 2,636,970 100.0 
• January to September 
• • percentage of cited countries by value 
Source : Elaborated from Manistry of Fanance data (cited in Financial Times, November 27, 1 989 piv) 
As Tables 7 shows, inward investment in manufacturing has outstripped that of all other 
sectors. Investment during the period 1987 to 1989 amounts to nearly 50% of total 
foreign investment over the last three decades. During the last three years, foreign 
investment in manufacturing has continued to proceed more rapidly than other sectors, 
with services, hotels, electronics and chemicals following in second, third, fourth and fifth 
place by value. 
Major European companies that have invested in Korea include: Philips, Valeo, LM Ericsson, 
ICI, Alcatel, Volvo and Saab. Large European companies are increasingly looking to Korea 
as a valuable market in its own right. Also, Korea is sometimes viewed as a base for 
exporting to other Pacific Basin economies. 
The growth of the domestic automotive industry is an example of Korean success attracting 
foreign investment. For instance, Valeo, a major European producer of automotive 
components, formed a joint venture with the Korean clutch maker Pyeong Hwa in order to 
supply Hyundai, Dywoo and Kia. This occurred as a result of current and future Korean 
automotive industry prospects. 
In 1989 the automotive sector attracted a large number of foreign investors. They began 
supplying the conglomerates with high technology designs, parts and components. To 
some extent, Korean firms encouraged European and US investment to reduce their 
technological dependence upon Japan. Hyundai, for example, encouraged its Korean 
suppliers to form joint ventures with US and European firms to reduce its dependence on 
Mitsubishi of Japan for vital inputs. 
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TABLE 7 : Foreign investment trends by sector. On approval basis, $ '000 
1987 
projs value projs 
Agri-fish 1 2,747 1 
Mftng 323 779,345 273 
Chemicals 45 153,401 44 
Machinery 48 87,645 62 
Electronics 80 212,157 55 
Transport 31 119,532 12 
eqpt 
Services 35 277,158 65 
Hotels 8 248,877 5 
Financial 1 16,080 7 
Totals 1962-1989 
projs value 
Agri-fish 80 35,165 
Mftng 2,450 4,406,413 
Chemicals 308 991,146 
Machinery 407 396,182 
Electronics 547 1,099,862 
Transport eqpt 113 643,299 
Services 419 2,385,956 
Hotels 76 1 ,696,191 
Financial 33 387,692 
Totals 12,041,906 
. 1989 f1gures for January to September 
• • percentage of products cited by value 
1988 1989* 
value projs value 
9,847 1 2,158 
738,174 143 568,198 
237,471 22 145,408 
64,972 29 70,082 
269,884 29 90,637 
43,138 11 142,890 
533,065 94 293,560 
418,902 2 96,669 
89,767 3 111,006 
Totals 1987-1989 
%** projs value 
0.03 3 14,752 
36.59 739 2,085,717 
8.23 111 563,280 
3.29 139 222,699 
9.13 164 572,678 
5.34 54 305,560 
19.81 194 1,103,783 
14.09 15 764,448 
3.22 11 216,953 
5,849,770 
%*. 
0.03 
35.65 
9.63 
3.81 
9.79 
5.22 
18.87 
13.07 
3.71 
%*. 
0.03 
35.65 
9.63 
3.81 
9.79 
5.22 
18.87 
13.07 
3.71 
Source : Elaborated from Ministry of Finance data (cited in Financial Times, November 27, 1989 piv) 
11.1.6. OUTWARD INVESTMENT BY KOREAN CONGLOMERATES 
- Outward investment has accelerated rapidly since 1 985 
Outward investment rose from an accumulated level of only $4 76m in 1985 to $1 .1 bn in 
1988. In February 1990, cumulative outward investment stood at over $2bn. According 
to the Bank of Korea, South Korean foreign investment rose by 93% in 1989. In this year 
the BOK approved 369 projects, together worth $927m. 
Most of the recent investments are small in terms of initial spend with some notable 
exceptions, such as Hyundai's automotive plant investment in Canada. The size of 
investments is expected to grow as companies move on from pilot plants to full scale 
production and local upstream and downstream investments. 
Only very recently have the Chaebol begun to formulate cogent international investment 
strategies. Among the Chaebol, Samsung probably boasts the most advanced foreign 
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investment programme. Samsung plans to increase its overseas electronics production from 
5% in 1989 to 25%-30% by 1992. The Financial Times quotes a senior Samsung official: 
"First you start exporting then you establish sales companies, then a production base and 
then a global marketing system. Four stages. We are in between the second and third 
stage" (November 27, 1989, pvi). 
Restrictions on outward investment were lifted as Korea's trade balance and foreign 
exchange reserves strengthened in the post-1985 period. Prior to this, most outward 
investment was limited to securing raw materials and establishing sales offices. 
Rapid wage rises have also encouraged the Chaebol to relocate overseas. To circumvent 
relatively high local wage costs, labour-intensive industries have begun to relocate abroad, 
especially in low-wage South Asian countries. 
Firms wish to locate production facilities closer to final markets in the US and Europe. This 
is seen as a mechanism of overcoming trade friction and a way of meeting technical 
demands of these regions. 
- The EC accounts for a very low share of outward investment 
North America accounts for 43% of Korea's accumulated outward investment since 1968 
(Financial Times, May 16, 1990 pvi). In the last two or three years, South East Asia 
(notably lndionesia, Malaysia and Thailand) has attracted investment because of low wage 
costs and growing market opportunities. To date, the EC only accounts for 4% of the 
accumulated total. 
Korean firms are aware of the importance of the European Community market. Each have 
investment strategies toward the EC. Table 8 provides details of electronics investments 
in the EC and neighbouring countries for 1989. 
Not all firms have begun investing in the EC or neighbouring countries. Hyundai, for 
instance, has decided not to expand within Europe ahead of 1992. Instead, Hyundai 
intends to form partnerships with European firms to market products globally. 
- Most firms now have operations abroad 
The Chaebol have invested in subsidiaries across the world. Goldstar, for instance, has 
operations throughout East Asia and North America, including joint ventures and wholly 
owned plants in the US, Mexico, West Germany, the UK, Italy, Egypt, Thailand, the 
Philippines and Indonesia. Samsung Electronics has ten plants abroad and has recently 
opened up a telecommunications and TV factory in Hungary (Financial Times, May 16, 
1990, pvi and pvii). In 1987 Samsung opted for a major UK production base within Europe 
to produce video recorders and microwave ovens (TV manufacture is concentrated in 
Portugal). In 1988, Hyundai Motors opened up a C$400m car assembly plant in Canada. 
Within Europe, Gold star's main consumer electronics facilities are located in West Germany. 
However, the firm has stated that it is attracted to the UK because of relatively low unit 
labour costs, availability of skilled workers, and regional support for investment. Goldstar 
established a £14m site in the north of England to produce microwave ovens. 
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TABLE 8 : Korean foreign direct investment in electronics in the EC and 
neighbouring countries, 1989 
Firm Country Year of Ownership Main 
establishment products 
Goldstar West Germany 1986 100% CTV, VTR 
England 1989 100% MWO 
Turkey 1987 25% MWO 
Samsung Portugal 1982 55% CTV 
Electronics England 1987 100% VTR, MWO 
Spain 1989 90% VTR 
Hungary 1990 40% CTV 
England 1989 - CTV 
Daewoo France 1988 51 % MWO 
Electronics Hungary 1989 51 % MWO 
England 1989 100% VTR 
Philco Greece 1987 40% PCB 
Saehan Northern 1987 100% Video tape 
Media Ireland 
Source : company data, cited in Jun and Kim (1 990) p65 
11.1. 7. INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE CHAEBOL 
-The Chaebol are the main instruments of Korea's industrialisation 
The Chaebol are large, multi-industry conglomerates. They have continued to dominate the 
Korean economy throughout its development. The most recent data available (1988) show 
that the top 30 Chaebol were equivalent to 94% of GNP. Although double counting of 
sales between and within business groups distorts this percentage upwards, it is clear that 
a large proportion of Korea's industrial output is concentrated in the Chaebol. Within the 
economy as a whole, the leading 30 firms employ around 18% of Korea's total workforce 
and account for 37% of total sales. 
The Chaebol have been the main instruments of Korea's economic growth. They have 
enjoyed substantial government subsidies, preferential treatme.nt and various forms of 
support. Much of their diversification has been through government directed loans. 
As Table 9 shows, the Chaebol are highly diversified, extremely large firms. Rather than 
divest or specialise, the groups are intending to further diversify their activities (e.g. 
Samsung intends to enter the car industry; two other groups are set to enter 
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petrochemicals). This makes modern management techniques, technology deepening and 
specialisation difficult to achieve. However, as discussed in Part 1.1.4, the leading firms 
are attempting to modernise their approach and decentralise their decision making. 
TABLE 9 : Leading Chaebol and their Major Activities, 1988 (Won Billions) 
Sales Net profit Main activities 
Samsung 21,248 293.5 Electronics, aerospace, textiles, food, 
insurance, advertising 
Hyundai 19,030 236.0 Construction, automobiles, 
shipbuilding, electronics, heavy 
machinery, insurance 
Goldstar 15,602 204.8 Electronics, semiconductors, oil and 
petrochemicals, trading, insurance, 
advertising 
Daewoo 10,401 115.8 Electronics, machinery, autos, 
shipbuilding, aerospace, financial 
services 
Sunkyong 6,388 102.0 Oil refining, petrochemicals 
Sangyong 4,316 135.0 Cement, autos, machinery, trading, 
financial services 
Source : Bank of Korea, cited in Financial Times, May 1 6, 1 990 pvii 
- Recently the Chaebol have come in for criticism 
The Chaebol are often accused of failing to make adequate long term investments in R&D, 
modern production facilities and product developments, especially during the post-1985 
boom years. In the car industry, for instance, Korean producers spent around 3% of sales 
on R&D, whereas their Japanese competitors (already boasting leading-edge technology) 
spent more than 5% of turnover on R&D. 
As Part 11.2 shows, corporate R&D investments in Korea are fairly low by international 
standards, but increasing. Overall, the ratio of R&D investment to GNP rose to 1.9% in 
1987 from 0.9% in 1982. The government target for 1991 is 3%, but this may not be 
achieved (Financial Times, May 1 6, 1 990 pvii). 
Low investments in R&D may, in part, be due to high debt ratios (often in excess of 
300%). However, many argue that the Chaebol concentrated on short-term profit making, 
rather than long-term technology investments during the growth years. Instead of 
restructuring for the future, it is argued that they were more concerned with, for example, 
profiteering through land speculation (e.g. Financial Times, May 16 1990, pvii). 
The unpopularity of the Chaebol in the period 1988 to 1 989 led the government to restrict 
credit limits and cross holdings of equity between the group affiliates. In 1990 the 
slowdown in growth strengthened the Chaebol's position and resulted in the removal of 
some of the restrictions placed upon them. 
In the main, the conglomerates are still run by their founder families. They are often 
politically well connected, sometimes cautious and traditional in their management 
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approach. Transition to second generation management has been made to some extent by 
some firms (e.g. Samsung, Goldstar and Sangyong). In others, old traditions continue. 
- Hyundai, for example, has been slow to change 
Hyundai is probably the least committed to fundamental changes of direction and 
management style. Hyundai, the second largest Chaebol, is still largely directed by the 75 
year old founder of the company. Despite the company's size (a turnover of $1 8bn in 
1988, boasting 175,000 employees and 25 subsidiaries) the Chairman's management style 
is autocratic and individualistic. Hyundai' s management take a confrontational approach 
to industrial relations. 
Hyundai, unlike Samsung and Goldstar, plans no fundamental change in direction; but like 
the other Chaebol, Hyundai is committed to improved quality, higher value-added, more 
strategic partnerships and heavier investments in R&D. However, there are no plans to 
narrow down on core businesses. Hyundai intends to remain in traditional areas such as 
shipbuilding, automobiles, and plant and machinery. The company intends to continue to 
diversify into new areas such as industrial electronics, mechatronics, semiconductors and 
consumer electronics. 
- leading firms are making huge efforts to adjust 
The need for change among the leading firms has led to efforts to improve product design 
capabilities, reduce dependence on OEM sales, and to adopt modern business management 
techniques. Firms such as Samsung and Goldstar have stepped up investments in R&D in 
order to shift into higher value-added production and to reduce dependence on Japanese 
suppliers of technology. 
11.1.8. PROGRESS TOWARDS ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION 
-Tariffs and import restrictions 
In 1989 nearly all industrial products were officially exempt from import restrictions, 
although a wide range of non-tariff barriers remain. On the other hand, there were heavy 
import barriers on agricultural goods. Generally, tariffs remain higher than those in the 
OECD economies. However, levels of import tariffs have fallen from 24% in 1983 to 18% 
in 1988 and 11% in 1989. In 1993 tariffs will be reduced to 8%, a level similar to those 
of most developed economies (Financial Times, May 16, 1990 piii). 
In October 1989 Korea reached an agreement in the GATT to eliminate, by 1997, existing 
quantitative restrictions on balance of payments grounds. These restrictions concerned 
mainly agricultural products. However, import bans or strict import vetinary and 
phytosanitary regulation apply to numerous agricultural products which may otherwise by 
considered "liberalised". In other cases, progressive market liberalisation may be nullified 
or heavily impaired by market regulation arrangements, including heavy subsidisation of 
local farm products (Communication from DGI, 21 November 90, Number 132383). 
- Falling exports have led to pressures for a return to protectionism 
The fall-off in export growth in 1 989 led to arguments within Korea that liberalisation of 
import markets would lead to severe balance of payments difficulties. A new cabinet 
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(installed in March 1 990) introduced some export promotion measures in an effort to revive 
exports, reminiscent of the export promotion policies of the 1 970s. 
Government officials denied that the economy would return to the 1970s' policies of import 
restrictions, closed markets and export subsidies. The US has partially succeeded in 
persuading Korea to open its markets to competition and to revalue the Won against the 
dollar. Given the dependence of Korea on the US market for its exports (around 28.9% of 
the total in 1989), Korea is more likely to take US interests into account when adopting 
liberalisation measures. 
- Foreign investment 
As of 1989, 79% of the sectors in Korea's standard industrial classification were open to 
foreign equity investment, and about 61 % of the service areas were open to foreign 
investment. Foreign investments may be subject to "performance requirements" in a 
national treatment basis, and to local equity participation requirements. Land acquisition 
and exploitation of land and other resources remain restricted. 
Foreign exchange and Won funding restrictions severely limit financing projects by foreign 
companies and are additional barriers to foreign investment. 
- Financial markets 
A liberalisation plan was announced in 1988. According to this plan the financial markets 
would be progressively opened to foreign competition but only after 1992 would direct 
foreign investment in the stock market be possible. However, previous promises (e.g. the 
commitment in 1 981 to open stock markets by 1 987) were not fulfilled and semi-official 
reports are now pointing out that the opening of Korean capital markets under Uruguay 
Round initiatives could constitute a serious threat for the survival of the sector 
(Communication from DGI, 21 november 90, Number 132383). 
There are three main elements in the de-regulation of Korean financial markets (see 
Financial Times, May 16, 1990 pii for details): 
(1 l Exchange rates- prior to 1989, the authorities were frequently accused of maintaining 
the Won at artificially low levels. Banks are now permitted to set their own rates within 
certain bands. However, the government still strongly influences the exchange rate 
through the "middle market exchange rate system" introduced in March 1990. This 
mechanism enables the Bank of Korea to exercise power over the day to day exchange 
rate. 
(2) Financial markets - the Korean stock market (now the tenth largest in the world) was 
capitalised at roughly $140bn in 1989 (it was expected to exceed $200bn by 1992, 
the date set for liberalisation). Although foreign investors were prohibited from 
investing directly in the Korean stock market, in 1990 a number of investment trusts 
for foreign investors were introduced. Korean firms were also allowed to issue 
convertible bonds overseas, with the implication that foreigners will eventually become 
direct holders of equities. In 1990 the government, for the first time, allowed shares 
of a major Korean company (Samsung) to be held by foreign investors. Most observers 
see these moves as the beginning of a controlled and gradual liberalisation of the stock 
market. It is likely, however, that restrictions on foreigners will remain for some time, 
especially on bond and money markets. 
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(3) Banking practices (including interest rate controls). Some de-regulation of banking 
began in 1988 when ceilings on some lending and deposit rates were lifted. However, 
further liberalisation, especially on deposits, would be needed to allow interest rate 
competition between banks. 
11.1.9. TRADE TRENDS: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
As Table 10 shows, Korea is heavily dependent on the US and Japan for both exports and 
imports. The EC region as a whole is also important for Korean exports (1 3.8% of the 
total) and imports (1 1 %) of the total. West Germany is the largest importer of Korean 
goods within the EC, accounting for 3.9% of the total in 1988 (EIU, 1 990). The UK is the 
second largest EC importer, accounting for 3.2% of total Korean exports in 1988. 
TABLE 10 : Shares of trade by region 1988 
Exports Imports 
North America 38.1 % 26.9% 
Japan 19.8% 30.7% 
EC 13.8% 11.0% 
Hong Kong and Singapore 8.1 % 2.2% 
Rest of world 20.2% 29.2% 
Source : Financial Times, May 1 6, 1 989, piv 
Turning to sectoral trends, clothing and apparel continue to be important items, but they 
no longer dominate exports (see Table 11 ). However, electronics-related goods (as defined 
in Table 11 I constituted 20.8% of total Korean exports in 1988, larger than any other 
closely related group of products. 
Table 11 illustrates the dynamism of Korea in the electronics industries. Samsung and 
Goldstar are planning to enter the world camcorder market, which may add significantly to 
the electronics export figures ($300m for Samsung alone). Samsung is now using its own 
brand name in an attempt to register the firm as a leading supplier of quality goods. Other 
major export items include passenger cars, footware, textiles, iron and steel. 
Data in Table 12 show that the Korean economy remains highly dependent on imports of 
raw materials, chemicals and petroleum. Despite advances in electronics and related 
industries, Korea is a major importer of electronic components. 
Sast Project 1 Report on Korea - Page 45 
Decision Base 
TABLE 11 :Selected major export items ($m), 1988 
%of total 
Apparel and clothing 8,695 14.3 
Passenger cars 3,336 5.5 
Footware 3,801 6.3 
Textile fabrics 2,766 4.6 
Iron and steel 3,049 5.0 
Electronics related of which : 12,644 20.8 
Transistors, chips etc 3,856 6.4 
Office machines 2,574 4.2 
Telecomms equipments 1,598 2.6 
TV receivers 1.421 2.3 
Gramaphones, speakers etc 1,766 2.9 
Radios 1.429 2.4 
Toys 1,023 1.7 
Ships and floating structures 1,760 2.9 
Total including others 60,696 100.0 
Source : Elaborated from EIU (1 990) 
TABLE 12: Selected major imports items, 1988 ($m) 
%of total 
Raw materials 7,742 14.9 
Chemicals 6,283 12.1 
Petroleum and products 3,837 7.4 
Electronic components etc. 3,591 6.9 
Iron and steel 2,082 4.0 
Aircraft 1.445 2.8 
Scientific instruments etc. 1,367 2.6 
T elecomms equipment 1,065 2.1 
Total incl. others 51,811 
Source : EIU (1990) 
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11.1.10. THE KOREAN ECONOMY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
To complete this section, it is interesting to view the Korean economy within the world 
context. Table 13 presents comparative technological indicators for Korea, the US, Japan 
and Taiwan. The Korean economy is small compared with the major economies of the 
world. Korea is less than 6% of the size of the Japanese economy and less than 4% of 
the US economy in terms of GNP. 
Korean per capita GNP is $4,000 per year, compared with $23,300 for Japan and $18,500 
for the US. Despite Korea's economic success, per capita incomes remain very low by 
OECD standards. Indeed, Korea's per capita GNP is below that of it nearest rival, Taiwan. 
Overall, Korean GNP is higher than Taiwan's because of a larger population. 
TABLE 13 : Comparative economic indicators, 1988 
Korea Taiwan Japan us 
GNP ($bn) 169.2 119.7 2859.7 4863.1 
(current prices) 
Per capita income ($'000) 4.0 6.0 23.3 18.5 
(current prices) 
Real GNP growth 1979-88 (%) 7.0 8.1 4.0 2.5 
Average annual inflation 1978- 9.3 5.0 2.6 6.1 
88 (consumer price index, %) 
Unemployment rate (%) 2.5 1.7 2.5 6.2 
Domestic savings rate (%) 37.7 36.3 33.7 13.8 
Population (m) 42.0 19.9 122.3 243.8 
Average annual growth of 1.3 1.6 0.7 1.0 
population 1979-88 (%) 
Source : Korea Economic Planning Board (cited in Financial Times, November 27 1989 pii) 
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11.2. THE S& T SYSTEM 
- Introduction 
This section analyses the S& T structures and spending in Korea. It is divided into three 
parts: 
11.2.1: S& T planning and institutions 
11.2.2: R&D spending patterns and comparisons 
11.2.3: International co-operation and future plans. 
The analysis covers the Korean Government Funded Institutes, Taedok Science Town, 
industrial R&D laboratories and the status of university S& T. Korea's spending on R&D is 
compared with that of other countries, as is government support for R&D. The opening up 
of Korea to international S& T co-operation is reviewed. Barriers to collaboration from the 
perspectives of Korea and the EC are also highlighted. 
For follow up purposes, Annex 1 lists a selection of major Korean S& T related ministries, 
institutions and their functions. 
11.2.1. S&T PLANNING AND INSTITUTIONS 
11.2.1.1. The planning mechanism for science and technology 
- Early objectives for S& T 
The early development pattern chosen by South Korea centred on the acquisition and 
absorption of technology. Shortages of skilled manpower and an inadequate research 
infrastructure hindered early development and limited the technological options open to 
companies. 
Joint ventures and OEM agreements were the main source of technology transfer during 
the 1970s and 1980s. Licensing agreements increased in importance as Korea improved 
its ability to absorb novel technologies. 
- The nature of the planning system 
On the face of it, the planning of S& T policy is fairly centralised and well co-ordinated in 
Korea. Long-term S& T policy, strategies and annual plans are drawn up by the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MOST) with extensive participation from other ministries such as 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). the Economic Planning Board (EPB) and the 
Ministry of Communications (MOC). 
Park ( 1988) cites three important characteristics of the planning system in Korea: 
(a) a high level commitment and frequent involvement of the President and ministers in the 
S& T planning process 
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(b) the informal mode of continuous consultation between individual ministri;es, industrial 
associations, industrialists, the government funded research institutes (Gfls) and 
universities 
(c) targetting of policies on well-defined, key areas of medium- to long-term importance, 
enabling the concentration of scarce investment and technological resources. 
Kim (1990), by contrast, argues that the institutional system has not been a runaway 
success: "Korea has never had a strong ministry like MITI [of Japan] for co-ordinating 
national systems for promoting industrial R&D" (p5). Kim stresses the conflict between 
ministries concerned with S& T and the difficulties of co-ordinating R&D in Korea. 
- Conflict between MOST and other ministries affects S& T policy 
MOST, established in 1967, was set up to formulate long-term policies on R&D and 
co-ordinate the various R&D activities of the other ministries. However, MOST's formal 
role of high-level planning and co-ordination tended to be ignored by other more powerful 
ministries during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Several important ministries are involved in S&T decision making (see Annex 1 ). The 
ministries tend to work within a "pecking order" in terms of power, n~sources and 
regulatory power. 
Although MOST has had formal responsibility for S& T policy and plannin", other more 
powerful ministries (e.g. Trade and Industry, Economic Planning, Communications and 
Energy) have had a significant say in the direction of Korea's S&T. 
- Other factors influence S& T policy 
Since the take-over of civilian government in 1987 and moves towards political 
democratisation, MOST has attempted to push its territorial claim over Korean S&T. 
However, these moves have coincided with other important factors which will shape the 
future direction of Korean S&T policy. These factors include: 
(a) international political pressures over trade and IPR, to force Korea to re-examine its 
intervention with respect to near-to-market activities (this could include technology 
support) 
(b) a government shift from direction and support of commercial activities towards more 
indirect contribution through: pre-competitive basic and applied research; the upgrading 
of research institutions and personnel; and improved co-ordination acmss ministries. 
MTI, for instance, intends to increase its technology support to industry 
(c) the initiation of several high technology development plans by various ministries, 
including EPB, MTI and MOST, to take Korea into the 1990s (see 2.14 below). 
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11.2.1.2. Government funded R&D institutes (Gfls) 
- GFis have substituted for university R&D 
Government funded R&D institutes have played a vital role in Korea's high technology 
development (probably unique among developing countries). In contrast to other 
industrialising economies, Korean S& T investments have occurred outside the university 
system in large institutes dedicated to support the industrial development of the economy. 
Architects of the GFI system in Korea argue that they needed to set up the GFis to 
circumvent the university establishment. They argue that universities in Korea saw 
themselves as "time honoured institutions" with little regard for industry or commerce. 
GFis took a lead role in Korea's technology development in the late 1960s and throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, they have received over 90% of research funding awarded 
by the government. 
During the 1980s there have been impressive cases of GFI-industry collaboration, leading 
to high technology market entry. Among the most well known are the semiconductor 
DRAM project and the TDX telecommunications exchange project, both sponsored by the 
MOST under the Electronic and Telecommunications Research Institute. 
- The GFI model began with KIST 
The GFI system began with the establishment of the Korea Institute of Science and 
Technology (KIST) in 1966. KIST was set up as a multi-disciplinary research institute. It 
had several ambitious goals: to absorb foreign technologies into Korea; to assist with their 
commercialisation; to create a climate for R&D activity in industry; and to modify and adapt 
advanced technologies. 
Following KIST's establishment and the diversification of Korea's industrial base, further 
specialist GFis were created. During the 1970s, roughly ten institutes were established in 
fields such as machinery, electronics and telecommunications. Several of the GFis are 
closely linked to related ministries. These include the Ministry of Communications and the 
Ministry of Energy and Resources. The Ministry of S& T provides supports to several of the 
GFis. 
Various re-organisations and funding changes have occurred within the GFI system (see 
Kim, 1989). For example, the Korea Institute of Electronics Technology was merged with 
the Korea Electrotechnology and Telecommunications Research Institute to form ETRI. The 
early development of telecommunications was funded by MOST. Later this responsibility 
was taken over by the Ministry of Communications. 
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TABLE 14: Technology development targets of selected GFis for the 1990s 
Institutes Principal coverage R&D target 
Korean Institute of new material - new material needed for next 
Science and Technology generation of hi-tech industry 
(KIST) 
environment - elimination of pollution-
generating factors 
mechatronics - CIM technology and intelligent 
robots 
housing - mass production of housing 
System Engineering software - supercomputers, systtams 
Research Institute (SERI) software 
- artifical intelligence 
- automated software 
development 
Genetic Engineering biotechnology - basic bio-tech for agriculture, 
Research Centre (GERC) medicine environment, health, medicine 
Korea Atomic Energy nuclear resource - own design atomic reactor 
Research Institute - radioactive waste mn!Jt. 
(KAERI) - use of radiation 
Korea Institute of Energy new energy - energy battery technc1logy 
and Resources (KIER) - solar energy 
- hydrogen energy 
Korea Standards metrics - basic metrology 
Research Institute (KSRI) standards - electromagnetic meas.ures 
- scientific instruments 
Korea Institute of leading edge - magnetic guided train system 
Machinery and Metals machinery & - aerospace materials 
(KIMM) materials - factory automation 
Electronics and semiconductors - advanced IC design 
Telecommunications computing - central processing units 
Research Institute (ETRI) communication - ISDN, satellite communications 
(continued overleaf ... ) 
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TABLE 14 : Technology development targets of selected GFis for the 1990s 
(continued) 
Institutes Principal coverage R,&D target 
Institute of Space Science astronomy - propagate conditions for 
and Astronomy space science Korean Space Industry 
Korea Research Institute for chemistry - new materials 
Chemical Technology -polymers 
(KRICTl -weaponry 
- anti-pollutants 
Korea Ginseng and Tobacco botanical - industrialisation of new natural 
Research Institute (KGTRI) medicines 
- production of botanical raw for 
medicine using biotechnology 
Korea Electric Technology electric - electricity supply technology 
Research Institute (KERI) technology - high speed metro 
- superconductive applications 
Korean Aerospace Research aerospace - aircraft systems 
Institute (KARl) - satellites and rockets 
Korean Research Institute ships - ship design and CSDP 
of Ships and Ocean ocean - submarine robotics 
Technology (KRISO) - ocean pollution protection 
Korean Ocean Research and ocean - mineral resource development 
Development Institute - ocean observation systems 
(KOROl) - South Pole resource exploration 
Source : Kyung ( 1 990) 
- GFis provide the backbone of Korean S& T 
Some of the GFis began as testing bodies, checking that products met nationally agreed 
requirements. Many were concerned with new product development- a role that industry 
was failing to perform during the late 1960s and 1970s. Some of the former MTI research 
institutes, such as the Energy and Resources and Chemical Technology Institute, were 
transferred to MOST. 
Although new specialist institutes spun off from KIST, KIST has remained central to Korean 
S& T development. Currently, KIST has three main centres (bio-engineering centre; systems 
engineering and ocean research). 
Table 14 lists 15 of the major GFis currently operating within Korea and provides details 
of their principal R&D interests. Currently, many of the GFis are attempting to shift away 
from applied R&D into more generic, basic and experimental R&D. This will be a major 
challenge to the GFis and it is an area where collaboration with Europe may benefit Korean 
S& T. Europe has significant experience in many of the basic technology areas Korea is 
now attempting to enter. 
As Part I argued, within Korea the GFis are sometimes criticised for lacking industry 
relevance. However, there can be no doubt that the GFis have provided Korea with a 
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technological "backbone". Without them, in all probability, this national S&T resource 
would not otherwise exist. 
As industry integrates backwards into R&D, the likelihood is that the GFis will prove to be 
a vital resource for industry, not only in basic and applied S& T, but also in terms of human 
resource supply, training, consultancy, international S&T monitoring and so on. Given the 
weakness of the university system in Korean S& T, the importance of the GFis to Korean 
S& T overall is without question. 
11.2.1.3. Formation of hi-tech "valleys" - Taedok Science Town 
- Taedok began with grand plans 
The government established two R&D centres: one in Seoul and the other in Taedok 
Science Town (in Taejon City), 170 kilometres (or two and a half hours) south of Seoul. 
Seoul Science Park began with three R&D institutes and three economic centres. Taedok 
Science Town is Korea's largest R&D complex. 
Plans for Taedok Science Town began in 1973. The town was eventually integrated into 
Taejon City in 1983. Taedok's aim was to attract clusters of GFis and private laboratories 
to Taejon. This called for a science area of 27.6 square kilometres with living quarters, 
cultural areas, educational institutes and production centres. The id1ea was for a 
self-sufficient science town with 50,000 people by the mid-1980s. (SincE! then, the aim 
has been scaled down considerably). 
By 1990, there were eleven GFis (four in basic research, three in energy and four others), 
three private institutes (Ssanyong Research Centre, Lucky Central Research Institute and 
Hangyang Research Institute), and four higher education units (Chungham University, 
Chungham College of Computer Science, KAIST and KIT). (Electronics KorE~a. May, 1990, 
Vol 3, No 7). Eleven out of Korea's total of 22 GFis are now located in Taedok. However, 
there are still nine GFis located within Seoul, despite efforts to attract them to Taedok. 
-Recent moves have provided a stimulus to Taedok 
Three GFis, the Korean Advanced Institute for Science and Technology (KAIST), the 
Systems Engineering Research Institute and the Genetic Engineering Centre moved to 
Taedok in 1990, providing a stimulus to the town. As a result, Taedok boasts around 
9,000 employees, including 1,087 PhD researchers, equivalent to 70% of all PhDs in 
Korean GFis. 
Efforts have been made to link education and training with R&D in Taedok, particularly with 
the relocation of KAIST (a graduate school of science) to the town. The Korean Institute 
of Technology (KIT) for undergraduates was also set up in Taedok in 1984. 
Taejon City decided to support Taedok by investing Won 1 bl) in 1990 to encourage the 
production of high technology products on the edge of the complex. 
MOST forecast that by the early 1990s, Taedok will host about 50 R&D institutes. Several 
corporations have plans to build R&D units in the town. 
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- Much of the plan has yet to be realised 
Institutional co-operation was expected to enliven R&D activities but, to date, there has 
been little networking among the institutes. There are one or two notable exceptions: for 
instance ETRI has co-operated well with the Korean Standards Research Institute (KSRI) in 
the telecommunications exchange project (TDX-1 ). 
Much of the "grand plan" has yet to be realised. The original idea was for a self-sufficient 
science town with 50,000 people by the mid-1980s. However, relatively few private R&D 
laboratories have moved to Taedok since 1979 and the original aims have been scaled 
down considerably. Even GFis have preferred to remain in Seoul, attracted by the 
concentration of economic and academic activities in the capital. For instance, although 
the KAIST educational establishment moved to Taedok, the research arm, KIST, remained 
in Seoul. Some argue that the Chaebol are purchasing land in Taedok, primarily as a means 
of land speculation (Electronics Korea, May, 1990, Vo1.3, No. 7 p38). 
As Kim (1989) notes, there are some signs that corporate R&D centres are clustering 
regionally around related interests. For example, most of the semiconductor and 
biotechnology laboratories are located in Seoul, telecommunications centres tend to be in 
the electronics industrial zone near Kumi, and new material institutes are near Pohang -
where the Pohang Steel Corporation has its steel headquarters and its own 
research-oriented private university. 
11.2.1.4. Private research laboratories 
- Private R&D laboratories began in the 1970s 
During the 1970s, private research institutes were established in the chemical, 
pharmaceutical, food and textile industries. As Bloom (1989) points out, significant private 
R&D in the electronics sector dates back to 1975, when Goldstar set up its Central 
Research laboratory. During the 1980s, private R&D laboratories began to proliferate. 
Many of these laboratories are extremely small. 
The Chaebol dominate both in terms of quantity and quality of research, as Table 15 
illustrates. Out of a total of 7,873 staff employed in institutes of more than 100 staff in 
1988, 6,347 (or 81 %) were employed by the four leading Chaebol: Samsung (31 %), 
Daewoo (18%), lucky (16%) and Hyundai (15%) (see Table 15). 
- Some R&D laboratories are not yet effective 
Bloom ( 1989) argues that the organisation of R&D within the corporate sector is not yet 
wholly effective. Firms have modern equipment and first rate staff, but have yet to learn 
how to manage research and researchers. Bloom suggests that there is a tendency for 
research directors to treat staff as though they were production engineers, and for the 
research to be conducted within an unduely structured and hierarchical environment. 
- Corporate R&D covers electronics, metals, machinery and chemicals 
The main thrust of corporate R&D is in electrical and electronics technology, including 
semiconductors and telecommunications. Other major fields covered include machinery and 
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metals, chemicals and textiles. Metats and machinery includes areas such as iron and steel 
making technology and advanced materials. 
- The Government has sponsored corporate R&D 
As Kim (19891 illustrates, the Korean Government has used three mechanisms to subsidise 
corporate R&D: direct subsidy; preferential financing; and tax incentives. 
Preferential financing through state-controlled banks and public funds has bt3en the most 
important mechanism for stimulating corporate R&D. In 1987, for instance, preferential 
funding accounted for 94.3% of total state-funded corporate R&D activities. In contrast, 
direct R&D subsidy accounted for only 4% and venture capital around 2% of publically 
funded corporate R&D (Kim, 1989, p13). 
TABLE 15 : Major private institutes 1n Korea (more than 1 00 staff), 1988 
Group/firm No. of R&D field 
Institution Staff • 
Hyundai [11431 
- Automobile Rl • • 863 Machinery and metals 
- Heavy Industry Rl 155 ibid 
- Electronic Rl 125 Electrical and electmnics 
Samsung [24751 
- Aviation Rl 207 Machinery and metals 
- Heavy industry Rl 130 ibid 
- Semiconductor & 1074 Electrical and electronics 
Communications Rl 
- Electronics Rl 770 ibid 
- Electron Devices Rl 186 ibid 
- Electricity Rl 108 ibid 
Lucky [1299] 
-Central Rl 528 ibid 
- Semiconductor Rl 328 ibid 
- Electricity Technology Rl 139 ibid 
- Communications Rl 121 ibid 
- Lucky Central Rl 183 Chemicals 
Daewoo [1430) 
- Heavy Industry Ri 404 Machinery and me!tals 
- Automobile technology Rl 238 ibid 
- Shipbuilding and Marine 172 ibid 
equipment Rl 
- Communications Rl 164 Electrical and electronics 
- Electronics Rl 452 ibid 
(continued •Jverleaf ••• ) 
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TABLE 1 5 : Major private institutes in Korea (more than 1 00 staff), 
1988 {continued) 
Group/firm 
Institution 
Others 
Kia industry Rl 
Pohang Steel Mill Rl 
Korea Electricity and 
telecommunications Rl 
Tong Yang Precision Central Rl 
Daeyoung Electronics Industry Rl 
Hankuk Tyre Rl 
Korea Explosives Rl 
Pacific Technical Rl 
Tong Yang Nylon Central Rl 
Kolon Technical Rl 
• figures in brackets = total staff February 1988 
• • Rl = Research Institute 
No. of Staff • 
[15261 
358 
141 
218 
126 
122 
124 
121 
102 
108 
106 
Source : Korea Business World, April 1988 (amended} 
R&D field 
Machinery 
and metals 
ibid 
Electrical and 
electronics 
ibid 
ibid 
Chemicals 
ibid 
ibid 
Textiles 
ibid 
Two schemes for direct subsidy were introduced in the 1980s: the National R&D Projects 
(NRP); and the Industrial Base Technology Development Projects (IBTDP). 
NRP is administered by MOST and is concerned with "new" (to Korea at least) technology 
areas, involving market externalities to justify government support (usually areas with a 
high risk of failure and/or wide economic and social benefits). New technology areas 
include machinery parts and components; new materials development; semiconductor 
design; super-minicomputer development; energy conservation technology; and 
biotechnology development. (Investment in NRPs are detailed in Kim, 1989, p11, Table 2). 
IBTDPs are administered by MTI. MTI conducts surveys annually to identify "urgent" R&D 
projects in industrial firms and provides subsidies to research organisations (GFis, 
universities and firms). In 1989, 174 technologies were identified and 146 projects funded, 
costing around $17.2m (Kim, 1989, p10). Although carefully targetted, such financial 
sums are small in comparison to support projects in many OECD economies. 
- Venture capital is weak in Korea 
Venture capital has been slow to develop within Korea. The government has introduced 
a number of small schemes to promote venture capital, however, it is not yet a major 
source of R&D funding. 
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-Tax incentives for large firms are important 
Tax incentives have been a major indirect mechanism for promoting corporate R&D. As 
Kim ( 1989) shows, there are five categories of relevant incentives: (a) reduced tariffs on 
import of R&D equipment and supplies; (b) deduction of annual capital R&D expenditure 
and personnel development costs from taxable income; (c) accelerated dE1preciation on 
industrial R&D facilities; (d) exemption from real estate tax on R&D establishments; (e) a 
tax reduction scheme which enables firms to set aside, annually, up to 30% of profits 
before tax to be used for R&D. 
11.2.1.5. Universities and the educational system 
- Basic education in Korea is extremely effective 
The importance of education in successive Korean Governments' modernisation plans is 
discussed in detail by MOST (1989), Kim (1989) and various others. Investment jn 
education grew from 2.5% of the government's budget in 1951 to 22% in 1!~87. In Korea, 
the government only provides one third of total education expenditure. The rest is borne 
by parents and the private sector. 
By the mid-1970s, the illiteracy rate had become so insignificant it was no longer 
measured. By 1987, 98.8% of all children were receiving education up to the age of 14. 
Attendance at college and university grew from around 1 0% of the population in 1970 to 
over 25% in 1987. 
Local education and overseas training are powerful forms of status and soc::ial advance in 
Korean society. In 1988 there were 1 .4m students in Korean higher education institutes 
and another 50,000 students overseas (Korea Business World, December, 1989). 
Korea has consistently surpassed other NICs such as Argentina, Brazil, India and Mexico 
by almost all indices of basic educational attainment. As recently as May 1990, the 
Financial Times cited the US Department of Education statistics to show the average 
mathematics proficiency of 13 year-olds in Korea was substantially better than their 
counterparts around the world: 
TABLE 16 : Mathematics proficiency of 13 year-olds in Korea and other countries 
South Korea 567.8 
Canada 529.0 
Spain 511.7 
UK 509.9 
Ireland 504.3 
us 473.9 
level 300 = simple addition and substraction 
level 400 = basic operations to solve simple problems 
level 500 = intermediate level skills to solve two step problems 
level 600 = measurement and geometry solving complex problems 
level 700 = more advanced mathematical concepts 
Source : US Department of Education (cited in Financial Times, May 4, 1990) 
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- But S& T training lags behind general education 
Despite advances in general education, according to a variety of sources (MOST 1990; Kim 
1989; Bloom 1989) Korea has yet to develop a comparable stock of highly trained 
scientists and engineers. The government plans to increase the number of scientists and 
engineers from 11 per 10,000 population in 1986 to 30 by the year 2,000. This would 
bring Korea up to the 1988 level of Japan. (MOST data, cited in the Korea Newsreview, 
February 3, 1990 p15). 
- There are plans to strengthen graduate S& T courses 
There is a strong commitment to expand graduate programmes in S& T to meet future 
needs. The proportion of science graduates is to be increased from 40% to about 60% (the 
present level of arts and social science graduates) by the year 2,000. Critics argue that 
it will take a great deal of effort to reform the old style teaching-oriented approach of the 
educational system. This may explain the continued emphasis on research-oriented 
teaching institutions, such as KAIST and KAITECH, within Korea. 
11.2.2. R&D SPENDING PATTERNS AND COMPARISONS 
11.2.2.1. The scale of S& Tin the international context 
- Korean investment is low by international standards 
According to MOST, Korea now stands thirteenth in the world's technology league in terms 
of technological investment and R&D manpower (see Table 17). At the present time, in 
comparison with the G7 averages on R&D investment expenditure and patenting activity, 
Korea is well behind the technology leaders. 
TABLE 17 : International comparisons of R&D indicators 
R&D R&D Per Patents Technology 
investment manpower 10,000 reg. trade $mn 
($bn) total pop. 
United 118.7 806,000 33 70,800 (86) 10,710 
States 
Japan (87) 62.3 418,000 34 102,600 (86) 5,270 
West 31.6 143,000 (85) 24 50,600 (86) 2,900 
Germany 
France (87) 20.0 105,000 (86) 19 35,500 (86) 2,300 
Britain (86) 12.9 90,000 (85) 16 17,500 2,270 
Italy (86) 7.5 64,000 11 47,900 (85) -
Canada 4.9 75,000 30 - -
(86) 
G7 average 36.8 243,000 - 541,500 4,690 
Korea (88) 3.2 57,000 14 5,300 773 
Korea 39.82 150,000 30 7 7 
(2001) 
Source: MOST (c1ted m the Korea NewsreVIew, February 3, 1990 p15) 
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- But there are plans to catch up 
In a plan announced by President Roh Tae-woo in a new year's conference (in 1990) Korea 
aims to be on par with the G7 nations by the end of the 1990s, both in terms of S&T 
capability and spend. The government is committed to provide the necessary support for 
R&D activities in universities as well as private firms. 
According to the plan, Korea's technology investment will reach $39.8bn by 2001, 
equivalent to 5% of GNP. By 2001 the plan forecasts a total of 150,000 S&T personnel. 
Thirty of every 10,000 workers are to be engaged in R&D programmes (Table 17). Areas 
in which Korea expects to reach the international frontier in basic R&D include 
semiconductors, computers, chemistry and new materials. 
- R&D spending has grown very rapidly 
Table 18 illustrates the increase in Korea's R&D activities over the period 1i971 to 1987. 
Albeit from a low base, R&D spending by government and the private sector rose very 
rapidly from Won 10. 7bn ($28.6m) in 1971 to Won 1 ,878bn ($2.37bn) in 1987. MOST's 
recent survey (1990a) puts the 1988 figure at $3.2bn. 
11.2.2.2. Patterns of spending on domestic R&D 
TABLE 18 : Major R&D indicators in Korea : Historical trends 
Won billion {current prices} 
1971 1976 1981 
Research expenditure 
- gov't funds 10.7 60.9 293.1 
- private funds 7.3 39.2 121.7 
- gov't:private ratio 68/32 64/36 42/58 
GNP 3,376 13,881 45,126 
R&D/GNP 0.32 0.44 0.65 
Numbers of 5,320 11,661 20,718 
researchers 
- gov't & GFis 2,477 3,592 5,065 
- universities 1,918 4,811 8,488 
-private 925 3,258 7,165 
- R&D exp/researcher 4,306 5,223 14,149 
- researcher/1 ,000 0.08 0.33 0.54 
pop. 
Number of corporate 1 12 65 
R&D laboratories 
Note : figures do not include research assistants, technicians and other supporting personnel 
Source: MOST Science and Technology Annals, various years, compiled by Kim (1989)p7 
1987 
1,878.0 
383.0 
20/80 
97,532 
1.93 
52,783 
9,184 
17,495 
26,104 
35,580 
1.27 
455 
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Despite Korea's very rapid growth, R&D spending grew faster than GNP, rising from 0.32% 
of GNP in 1971 to 2.01% in 1988. Data from the EPB put the current ratio of R&D:GNP 
at 2.6% in 1989 (the government target being 4.0% GNP by 1996). Even at current prices 
these changes demonstrate a very substantial increase in R&D spending. 
As Kim (19891 points out, the acceleration in R&D expenditure during the early 1980s was 
due to the shift away from the promotion of light/mature industries to heavy and 
technology-based industries. R&D spending has continued to accelerate as Korean firms 
diversify into higher technology industries. 
TABLE 19 : National project R&D investment 
Unit = Won billion (current prices) 
1982 1983 
Public and industrial 
projects 
Projects with public 8.2 13.9 
leadership 
Public R&D institute- 4.6 6.7 
industry joint projects 
matched by private 5.0 12.6 
sector 
Number of projects 66 106 
Number of corporations 86 131 
involved 
International joint - -
projects 
Basic research - 1.0 
Technical assistance to 0.4 0.4 
SMEs 
R&D evaluation projects - -
Total national project 13.3 22.0 
spend 
1984 1985 
16.1 17.3 
4.5 8.1 
9.0 13.2 
106 186 
134 212 
- 1.6 
0.9 1.5 
0.5 1.0 
- 0.5 
22.0 30.0 
Source :Science and Technology Annals, 1988. Compiled by Kim (1989) p11 
- The private sector shoulders most of the R&D burden 
1986 1987 
27.1 28.2 
15.1 18.1 
46.1 49.5 
296 370 
240 250 
2.3 2.9 
5.0 5.0 
1.5 N/A 
0.6 0.8 
51.7 55.0 
As Table 18 shows, the private sector has steadily taken on more responsibility for the 
country's R&D efforts. This is largely due to the gradual technological upgrading of the 
Chaebol and their diversification into technologically intensive areas. In 1971, the public 
sector accounted for 68% of R&D expenditure. This fell to only 20% in 1987. 
- R&D laboratories have proliferated 
A large rise in corporate R&D laboratories is registered in Table 18, from only one in 1971 
to 455 in 1987. Many of these units are extremely small (more than 70% employed less 
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than 30 researchers in 1987; a further 20% employed 30 to 100 researchers). However, 
the large firm institutes are growing in importance. Twenty-nine institutes with more than 
1 00 engineers in 1 987 employed around 8,000 researchers. Samsung, the leading R&D 
spender, boasted an R&D staff of around 2,475 in 1988; Hyundai's R&D staff was roughly 
1,143 and Lucky-Goldstar's was 1,299 (Korea Business World, April, 1988). 
More recent data from the Korean Industrial Research Institute record a total of 604 R&D 
laboratories for 1988. KIRI state that 264 of the institutes are run by conglomerates, while 
340 are run by small and medium size firms. 
It is not possible to comment in detail on the activities of these corporate "R&D 
laboratories". There is some indication that the figures may be inflated due to preferential 
treatment by the government for R&D spending by firms. However, there can be no doubt 
that corporate commitment to applied research has increased, especially on the part of the 
Chaebol. 
- Government wishes to increase its participation 
Very recent data indicate that the government wishes to broaden its role in R&D and 
increase its share of R&D spending. Park Un Suh, Director General of MTI (cited in Far 
Eastern Economic Review, April 1990, p142), for instance, states that the SJOvernment's 
R&D spending is expected to rise from 20% to around 30% by 1994. (This ccJmpares with 
a 50% to 60% share of government R&D spend for the US, France and We:st Germany). 
GFis have taken on the main burden of advanced R&D in Korea. Kim (1989) notes that GFis 
have also been major instruments for national projects. For instance, they have received 
over 90% of research grants awarded by government in "new" technology ;areas. 
As discussed earlier (section 11.2.1.5), little progress has been made in building up a strong 
basic research capability in the university sector. There are very few R&D facilities at 
Korean universities. Personal computers are fairly unusual and sophi:sticated data 
processing equipment is extremely uncommon in universities. Sung Ki Soc1, head of the 
Systems Engineering Research Institute, argues that Korea's Education Ministry imposes 
a "deadening egalitarianism which condemns all universities to the same shabby level of 
facilities" (Far Eastern Economic Review, April 1990, p142). 
Although the number of universities now exceeds 1 00 (and despite the fact that university 
R&D expenditure has risen from Won 572m in 1971 to Won 198bn in 1987) universities 
still only account for around 6% of R&D expenditure. As a supply of personnul, universities 
are undoubtedly important. They account for over 30% of Korea's R&D manpower and 
75% of PhD-level personnel in S&T. 
11.2.2.3. Government support for R&D projects 
Table 19 gives a profile of the government's commitment to national R&D projects. 
Spending increased from Won 13.3bn ($17.7m) in 1982 to Won 55.0bn ($6fl.4m) in 1987. 
The government's subsidy to the private sector in these projects more than quadrupled 
during this period. 
However, Korean national project spending is low by OECD standards. Indeed, it is 
dwarfed by single national programmes and projects such as the UK Alvt3Y Programme 
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($500m over five years) and the US Sematech venture ($1.5bn for semiconductors alone, 
over a five year period). 
Also, spending on international JOmt projects remains low, as does basic research 
expenditure. Technical assistance to SMEs is thin, despite the strong expressed 
commitment to building up Korea's base of small and medium firms. 
TABLE 20: Supply and distribution of total R&D, 1988 
Unit = Won millions, current prices 
By source: 
Government 17.71 % 637.6 Won million 
Private 82.27% 2,961.7 
Foreign 0.02% 0.7 
By executor : 
GFI 20.50% 738.0 Won million 
Higher ed 9.92% 357.1 
Company 69.58% 2,504.9 
By character of R&D : 
Basic 15.56% 560.2 Won million 
Applied 19.81 % 713.2 
Development 64.63% 2,326.7 
100.0% 3,600.0 
Source : MOST (1990a) 
TABLE 21 : Supply and distribution of total R&D by character of 
R&D 1985 to 1988 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
Basic research (share in %) 
GFis 15.7 19.8 19.9 19.7 
Universities 65.3 66.5 77.2 72.8 
Companies 9.4 7.4 5.6 6.2 
Applied research (share in %) 
GFis 42.0 28.1 27.8 36.8 
Universities 28.0 27.8 17.9 20.4 
Companies 24.4 26.1 16.8 14.7 
Development (share %) 
GFis 42.3 52.1 52.3 43.5 
Universities 6.6 5.8 4.9 6.8 
Companies 66.2 66.5 77.5 79.1 
Source : MOST (1990a) 
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11.2.2.4. The focus and sourcing of recent Korean R&D spending 
Table 20 illustrates the trends in Korean R&D activity by source and distribution of total 
R&D spending for 1988. The data confirm that R&D is mainly privately funded and 
executed in Korea. Relatively little spending is allocated to higher education as compared 
with Gfls. Funding tends to be allocated to developmental, rather than basic or applied 
research. 
Table 21 shows the relative contribution of firms, GFis and universities to total R&D spend 
for the period 1985 to 1988. Universities have increased their contribution to basic 
research and moved away from applied work, but not to any substantial degre,e. GFis have 
shifted slightly towards basic research since 1985, at the expense of applied work. Firms 
have increased their contribution to developmental work at the expense of basic and 
applied research. 
11.2.2.5. Corporate R&D by sector 
During the 1980s, Korean industry allocated around 5% to 6% of sales to Fl&D, with the 
Chaebol spending slightly more overall. In the electronics industry the average was 3.81% 
of sales. According to data from the Korean Industrial Research Institute, in 1 988 R&D 
spending across industry increased by 26.7% to reach Won 1,486 trillion (approximately 
$2.25bn) (Korea Business World, December, 1989, p61 ). 
Table 22 shows R&D investment by Korean firms, by sector, for 1987. Electrical/electronic 
is by far the largest single sector, accounting for 36% of corporate spending. 
Transportation comes a poor second at 16%, with machinery at 11% and chemicals at 
10%. 
TABLE 22: Korean private R&D expenditures by sector, 1987 
Electrical/electronics 3,6% 
Transportation 16% 
Machinery 11 % 
Metal products 3% 
Chemical products 10% 
Textiles 4% 
Other 20% 
Total 100% 
Source : Science and Technology Yearbook 1987 (cited in Korea Business World, 1989, IP61 I 
The Korean Institute for Economics and Technology forecast a substantial rise in corporate 
commitment by the year 2000. KIET forecast that total corporate R&D spend will increase 
from Won 585bn in 1990 to Won 2,628bn in the year 2000 (a rise from 6% to 8% of 
sales) (Korea Business World, December, 1989, p61 ). 
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11.2.3. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND FUTURE PLANS 
11.2.3.1. Foreign technology acquisition - historical trends 
- Early policies were very restrictive 
Historically, Korea has relied on foreign technology acquisition for industrial development. 
As Kim (1989) argues, in the early years of industrialisation technology was non-critical and 
the mature technologies concerned were relatively easily absorbed through mechanisms 
such as reverse engineering. During this stage, policies for direct foreign investment and 
foreign licensing were very restrictive. 
During the 1980s, as technology has become a critical factor in Korea's competitiveness, 
the government gradually liberalised its policies towards direct foreign investment and 
foreign licensing in order to enable an inflow of technology. 
- Licensing and direct investment took off in the 1 980s 
Table 23 presents a variety of indicators of technology transfer to Korea. DFI and FL took 
off in the 1980s with the liberalisation of government policy. As Kim (1989) points out, 
over 48% of total DFI and 67% of royalty payments in FL since 1962 occurred in the last 
five year period recorded (1982 to 1986). 
- Japan and the US dominate technology transfer 
Table 23 shows that Japan has taken the lead in DFI, while the US has remained ahead of 
Japan in terms of FL and technical consultancy. There has been a substantial shift away 
from Japan and the US since 1982, as far as capital goods imports are concerned, with 
"others" accounting for 62% of imports over the period 1982 to 1986. 
- Capital goods imports have been the main channel of transfer 
Table 23 suggests that imports of capital goods have been the principal source of 
technology transfer to Korea over the past three decades. Korea remains a heavy importer 
of capital goods and in some areas is still dependent on overseas contractors for large scale 
projects (e.g. in the nuclear and train industries). However, in many areas Korea now 
boasts substantial domestic capability. 
- Informal technology acquisition has also been important 
A flow of foreign-educated scientists and research personnel has played an important role 
in the development of Korea's research capabilities. Since 1968, the government has 
encouraged Korean scientists and engineers working overseas to return. To date, 1,500 
personnel have been repatriated, including several key individuals. MOST forecasts that 
another 2,000 will have been induced back by the year 2000. 
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TABLE 23 :Foreign technology·transfer to Korea. Unit : $ million, 
current prices 
67-71 72-76 
1 . Direct Foreign Investment (OFI) 
Japan 90 627 
us 95 135 
All others 34 117 
Total 219 879 
2. Foreign Licensing (Fl) 
Japan 5 59 
us 8 21 
All others 4 17 
Total 17 97 
3. Technical Consultancy 
Japan 12 8 
us 3 6 
All others 2 5 
Total 17 19 
4. Capital Goods Imports 
Japan 1,292 4,423 
us 472 1,973 
All others 777 2,445 
Total 2,541 8,841 
Source : Ministry of Finance for DFl and Fl 
MOST for technical consultancy data 
77-81 82-86 T1otal 
301 875 1 ,!~01 
235 582 1,072 
184 310 l559 
720 1,767 3,l532 
140 324 !527 
159 603 '792 
152 259 431 
451 1,186 1,750 
21 89 130 
17 159 185 
17 84 108 
55 332 423 
14,269 20,986 41,118 
6,219 12,394 21,133 
7,490 53,338 64,143 
27,978 86,718 126,394 
Korean Society for the advancement of machinery Industry for capital goods data 
Compiled by Kim (1989) p23 
Consultants from both the US and Europe have made a valuable contribution to Korean 
industry. Also, Korean companies have pursued a policy of recruiting retired (and 
increasingly non-retired) employees of Japanese companies to act as consultants and 
impart valuable product and process information. 
This cadre of experts has provided a source of fresh knowledge about state-of-the-art 
technologies. In some cases, they have made a direct managerial and business input, as 
with researchers from the US Du Pont laboratories. 
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TABLE 24 : KOSEF's co-operation with Foreign Agencies 
Date of 
Agency Exchange/ Programmes 
Memoranda of 
Uniderstanding 
National Science Foundation 24.5.77 Co-operative Research (CRJ 
Joint Seminars (JS) 
Exchange of Scientists (ES) 
Deutsche 4.7.77 CR,JS,ES 
Forschungsgemeinschaft 
Centre National de Ia 28.7.78 CR,JS,ES 
Recherche Scientifique 
Japan Society for Promotion 24.5.77 CR,JS, ES 
of Science Foundation 
Academy of Science 31.5. 79 ES 
Research and Technology 
Egypt 
Alexander von Humboldt 1.9.82 ES 
Foundation 
Royal Society of London 22.4.83 ES 
Royal Swedish Academy of 23.11.84 ES 
Engineering 
Fellowship of Engineering 23.11.88 ES 
National Research Council 26.1.89 CR,JS, ES 
Source : KOSEF (1990) 
11.2.3.2. Examples of international R&D co-operation 
- Institutions and government support foreign R&D collaboration 
The Korean Science and Engineering Foundation (KOSEF), established in 1977, is partly 
responsible for building up the scientific infrastructure of Korea. KOSEF provides funds for 
the academic sector and boasts a series of co-operation programmes with international S& T 
agencies. Its total budget allocation for 1989 (including Government Support Fund) was 
Won 34,975m (roughly $51 m). KOSEF's main co-operation programmes are outlined in 
Table 24. 
Korea is following a general policy of expanding its presence in key foreign science parks. 
To date, seven GFis and 19 corporate subsidiaries have established units within foreign 
science parks as part of Korea's development of an international R&D network. 
According to MOST (1990a), Won 2bn (around $3m dollars) are to be allocated to a project 
to assist co-operation with technologically advanced countries over the seven year period 
1990 to 1996. Co-operation is to be promoted in the fields of welfare technologies such 
as basic science, environment, traffic and aeronautics, ocean exploration and high speed 
trains. 
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- Collaboration has begun within some EC member states 
Within the EC, ministerial talks on S&T were planned with: the UK (March 1 H90); France 
(June 1990); and West Germany (July 1990). In the US, the MOST report (1990a) 
suggests that Korea is currently re-negotiating a co-operative S& T agreement which expired 
in 1988. With Japan, Korea is hoping to set up a joint-committee on basic sciience and an 
evaluation centre for new materials. (Pr-esident Roh visited Japan in May 1990 for talks on 
trade and S& T). 
The UK exports chemicals, plant and machinery, and scientific instruments to Korea. Korea 
has strong ties with UK firms such as GEC, British Aerospace and Barclays B<mk. In S& T, 
the UK has formal arrangements with 18 Korean Universities and more are being discussed. 
The Korean Institute of Technology, for instance, collaborates with Imperial College in 
london. The UK was involved in the setting up of Ulsan Institute of Technolc)gy (now the 
University of Ulsan) and the Pohang Institute of S&T. 
In November 1989 President Roh Tae-woo met Mrs. Thatcher. The two lead1ers agreed to 
promote joint ventures in the fields of IT, energy, industrial waste processing, robotics, 
construction and anti-pollution technologies by combining UK technology with Korean skills 
and enterprise. President Roh expressed a commitment to the protection of IPR and trade 
and investment liberalisation. 
In November 1989 President Roh Tae-woo, on a state visit to France, agreed with President 
Mitterand on the transfer of French high technology in the fields of aerospact:t and genetic 
engineering. The two Presidents also agreed to promote joint ventures in construction, 
industrial plant and natural resources. 
A programme of co-operation has begun between the CNRS of France and KOSEF, enabling 
the new Korean university centres of excellence to co-operate with their counterpart 
laboratories at the CNRS (Korea Newsreview, December 2, 1989, p4-5). 
- S& T collaboration may take place with North Korea and China 
With North Korea, the government is identifying various foreign policy initiatives, including 
S& T ministerial talks and exchanges of scientists and technologists. The possibility of 
North/South co-operation follows on from a number of commercial ventures between 
Chaebol (notably the Lucky Group) and North Korean interests. 
Korea has established a number of agreements with China on joint ventures in high 
technology R&D (Korea Business World, March, 1 990) in areas such as semiconductors 
(notably application-specific integrated circuits). 
- Korea has links with Sweden 
With Sweden, Korea has strong trade and technical relations with large 1firms such as 
Ericsson and Saab-Scania. A Swedish-Korean Trade Council was recently created to 
oversee trade and S& T relations between the two countries. In 1982 the Korean 
Telecommunications Authority selected Ericsson to install its AXE switchiing system in 
Korea. Ericsson then formed a joint venture with Korea's Oriental Precision Company, 
which gave birth to Otelco in 1983 (a producer of telecommunications equipment) (Korean 
Business World, January 1989, p48). 
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By 1988 one million AXE exchange lines had been manufactured in Korea and installed by 
Otelco. Ericsson transferred switching technology to Otelco in a major telecommunications 
venture, which required some 400 man months in overseas training for Koreans and 1000 
man months of Swedish expert assistance. Deals with Swedish firms also cover truck and 
aircraft manufacture (Korea Business World, June 1988, p51 ). 
- The US is a major S& T partner 
As discussed in Part I, the US has a long tradition of collaboration in S& T at all levels with 
Korea. The US Government was instrumental in establishing and funding KIST in 1966. 
More recently, the National Academy of Science conducted a feasibility study which led 
to the formation of the Korean Science and Engineering Foundation (KOSEF) in 1 977. 
The US has many operations and joint ventures in Korea covering a wide range of technical 
areas. Firms such as IBM, DEC and Hewlett Packard compete for market share within 
Korea. Samsung's founder, Lee Byung-choll, visited the US in 1976 and met David Packatd 
and William Hewlett. This meeting led to a major joint venture between Samsung and 
Hewlett Packard (Korea Business World, January 1989, p48). 
-So is Japan 
Japan has been one of the main sources of technology to Korea. Cases of technology 
transfer increased 20% to 30% per annum since the early 1970s, when they reached a 
peak of 307 cases in 1987. This declined to 180 cases in 1989. According to Korean 
observers, this recent decline reflects the reluctance of Japan to transfer technology in 
areas where Korea is now competing with Japan. Sensitive technology areas include: 
automobiles, colour TVs, semiconductors and VTRs (Korean Times, 2 June, 1990). 
President Roh Tae-woo attempted to rebuild S& T links with Japan on a state visit in 1990. 
During the visit, the two countries agreed to launch a joint high technology R&D venture 
and to dispatch 1 ,000 Korean trainees to Japan for vocational training over a five year 
period (Korean Economic Journal, 11 June, 1990). 
- Eastern Europe is widely discussed 
R&D collaboration with Eastern Europe is expected to continue with several countries, most 
notably Hungary. The first ministerial talks between the two countries were held in Seoul 
in May 1990. 
Five million dollars over a five year period are to be allocated to establish a joint Eastern 
Europen-Korean research co-operation centre. Korea has already participated in technology 
exchange projects on space and aeronautics, communications satellites, basic science and 
ocean exploration with the USSR. Korea intends to promote more ministerial talks and to 
reach agreements with the Soviet Science Academy. 
The USSR has requested help from Korea to convert military plants over to civilian 
purposes. Korean firms are also proposing to import advanced technology from the USSR 
because of technology restrictions from other countries (Korea Newsreview, 31 March, 
1990, p13). A 21 member Soviet delegation visited Seoul in March 1990 to discuss 
Korean-Soviet economic co-operation. 
Page 68 - Sast Project 1 Report on Korea 
Decision Base 
The USSR offered Korea 786 technologies for appraisal, half of which are said by MOST 
to be "available for commercial use immediately or within five years" (Ko1rea Economic 
Journal, 11 June, 1990). 
Although at the present time the USSR appears an attractive source of technology to 
Korea, it may be that the appeal is short lived. Among the problems faced by Korean firms 
in the USSR are poor infrastructure, shortages of raw materials, restrictions on profit 
remittances and conversion of the rouble into hard currencies. Differences in cultural and 
business practice have also proved significant in some cases. 
11.2.3.3. Barriers to collaboration: intellectual property, tariffs, 
trade and foreign investment 
- Tariff rates 
Historically, Korea has used its developing country status to control direct foreign 
investment and to limit participation by outsiders in local markets. 
Under severe US pressure Korea made unilateral concessions to the US, lowering its tariff 
rates for a range of items mostly of interest to the US (Communication f'rom DG 1 , 21 
November 90, Number 132383). More generally, as Table 25 shows, Korec:t has gradually 
reduced its tariffs from 1982 to 1 988 on manufactured goods and agricultural products. 
In 1987 the Korean EPB and the Ministry of Finance began an import liberc~lisation drive. 
They lowered import duties on 436 commodities in March 1988 and put in place a plan to 
progressively lower the basic tariff rate from 20% to an average of 10% to 15% (Korea 
Business World, March, 1988). 
However, Korean tariffs remain higher than those of developed countries. The official 
policy is to reduce tariffs to to approximately those of developed countriies. Table 26 
shows the planned tariff cuts for industrial and agricultural imports which have recently 
been postponed for one year. 
TABLE 25 : Average Korean tariff reduction trend 
Year 82-83 84 85 86 87 88 
Total 23.7 21.9 21.3 19.9 19.3 18.1 
Manufac- 22.6 20.6 20.3 18.7 18.2 16.9 
tured goods 
Agricultural 31.4 29.6 28.8 27.1 26.4 25.2 
products 
Source : Ministry of Finance (cited in Korea Business World, March 1988 p36) 
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- "Super 301" 
Korea's tax and duty structure has caused widespread concern in the US and Europe. 
According to outside traders, "layer upon layer" of Korean duties and taxes have priced 
foreign goods out of the Korean market (Korean Business World, March, 1988). 
In 1989, Korea faced being identified as an unfair trader by the US. However, in 1990 the 
Bush administration decided to leave Korea off the "Super 301" list of unfair traders 
(Electronics Korea, June 1990, Volume 3, No. 8). This was partly due to a sharp reduction 
in the US trade deficit with Korea (by $2.6bn to $6.3bn in 1989), combined with an overall 
US merchandise export growth of 20% to Korea in 1989. 
Also, the steady appreciation of the Won during the period 1985 to 1989 led Korea's 
removal from the US list of ·currency manipulators• in 1989 (for the first time). 
- Unilateral concessions to the US 
Under severe US pressure, Korea made unilateral concessions to the US, lowering its 1983 
tariff rates in 1987 across more than 200 items of interest to the US. More generally, as 
Table 25 shows, Korea has gradually reduced its tariffs since 1982 to 1983 in 
manufactured goods and agricultural products. 
Although tariffs remain higher than those of the OECD economies, import tariff rates have 
fallen from 24% in 1983 to 18% in 1988 and 11% in 1989. In 1993 tariffs will be 
reduced to 8%, a level similar to those of most developed economies (Financial Times, May 
16, 1990 piii). 
TABLE 26 : Planned five-year tariff cuts 
1988 1989 1990 1992* 1993 1994 
Average rates for total imports 18.1 12.6 11.2 9.5 8.1 7.1 
Industrial products 16.9 11.5 9.9 8.4 6.9 6.1 
Agricultural products 25.2 18.8 18.1 15.4 14.7 12.4 
originally 1991, now postponed for one year (see text) 
Source : Ministry of Finance (cited in Korea Business World, July 1988 p71) 
- Further tariff cuts are planned 
There can be little doubt that the tariff position has improved markedly in recent years. 
However, some US officials are still concerned that significant trade barriers existed in 
1990. Critics remain cynical about the sincerity of the Korean government to meet its 
liberalisation targets. This cynicism is due not just to the high standard import tariffs on 
many goods, but to a combination of tariffs, cumulative taxes and invisible trade barriers. 
The EC has continued to press for tariff reduction. The EC has argued that Korea's strong 
balance of payments surplus is inconsistent with remaining import restrictions (CEC 1989). 
Further liberalisation measures wer.e promised by Korea during consultations between Korea 
and the EC in July 1989 to take effect after 1991. In some areas, e.g. cars, the EC have 
welcomed reductions in import tax (CEC 1989). 
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- Non tariff barriers 
In the case of Korea, market opening depends more on the highly effective non-tariff 
measures than on the protection provided by tariff rates. In this area and despite some 
improvements, the situation is disappointing. Internal taxation, labelling nequirements, 
safety and technical regulations, customs procedures, and trade-relatE~d financing 
restrictions are used by the Korean administration as instruments to dEtter imports, 
especially those of consumer goods (Communication from DGI, 21 November 90, Number 
132383). 
- IPR problems have caused friction with the EC 
In response to increasing international pressure and after fairly difficult bilateral! negotiations 
with the US, the Koreans enacted, in 1987, new laws on intellectual property which were, 
broadly speaking, consistent with currently accepted standards. 
In their general application, the new laws apply only prospectively (i.e. they do not create 
any new protection in respect of those matters, particularly copyrights and patents, which 
were in being prior to the date of the new legislation and were not protected previously). 
However, the US, using the threat of action under trade legislation, negotiated additional 
transitional measures which benefit only US nationals. 
The EC made it clear that it could not accept such discrimination and asked for identical 
treatment to that given to the Americans. After discussions with the Korean authorities the 
EC failed to reach a satisfactory solution to this matter (Communication from DG1, 21 
November 90, Number 132383). 
Since then, the issue has been the continuing focus of Community concern in contacts with 
the Korean side. The Koreans are basically still offering far less, both in terms of duration 
of protection and number of products covered, than they have granted to the US. 
- IPR conflicts have eased with the US 
In response to measures taken by the government, Korea was downgraded in 1989 from 
the "priority watch list" to the less significant "watch list" of IPR suspected violators by 
the US administration. 
Although the conflict with the US has eased, IPR and trade issues remain high on the 
agenda of bilateral US-Korean discussions and the GATT negotiations. Specific problems 
remain which could also prove to be a source of difficulty for future Korean-EC 
collaboration in S& T. 
- Foreign investment 
Direct foreign investment in Korea has continued to increase through the 1980s due to 
rapid industrial growth, an improving investment climate and an attractive domestic market. 
Many sectors are now open to investment from abroad. The legal environment and general 
business conditions are still matters of concern for foreign investors. (See Parts 11.1.8 and 
II. 1.9 for details). 
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- Korean complaints against the EC 
Korea, in its turn, has registered a series of problems with the EC regarding protectionism 
and unfair practise. They include specific complaints concerning: 
- anti-dumping measures on VCRs 
-an EC decision on Hyundai {sub judice in 1989) 
- local content regulations {refuted by the EC) 
- lack of transparency on the part of Korean inward investors in the EC 
- residual import restraints of France {to be removed in 1992) 
- import restrictions on Korean cars {some member states). 
Source: CEC (1989) 
Korean officials and analysts accuse the EC of increasing protectionism {see Jun and Kim, 
1990 p63-64). Protectionist measures include quotas on Korean colour TVs, the raising 
of domestic content requirements {ranging from 40% to 45%) for local production units, 
a block on knocked-down assembly kits from Korea and other anti-dumping measures. EC 
officials deny these charges {verbal communication from DGI, 8 November 90). 
Table 27 provides a listing of current Korean trade disputes with the EC and the US. 
- Impact on future EC-Korean S& T collaboration 
Although there is a long-term trend towards improved IPR protection, market liberalisation 
and so on, severe short-term difficulties dominate the focus of EC relations with Korea. 
There can be no doubt, that from the Commission perspective, current problems pose a 
stumbling block to collaboration between the EC and Korea in S& T. 
TABLE 27 : Major trade disputes in progress with the EC and the US 
Country Product Filing date 
us CTV May. 1983 
CPT Nov. 1986 
Key phone system Dec. 1989 
Cellular phone April 1989 
EC CTV Aug. 1987 
COP Jan. 1987 
Video tape Sept. 1987 
Audio tape Jan. 1989 
VCR Sept. 1 986/Feb. 1 989 
MW oven Sept. 1988 
CPT Feb. 1988 
Source : MTI data cited in Jun and Kim ( 1990) p64 
The longer-term improvements achieved by Korea can not be denied. However, problems 
still remain and these need to be resolved to enable EC-Korean S& T co-operation to 
proceed. 
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11.2.3.4. Policy plans and strategies for the 1990s- MOST 
In the last year or so, three of the main organisations concerned with S& T (MOST, EPB and 
MTI) have formulated future plans for S& T. These are summarised below. 
The future goals of MOST are spelled out in its annual report and occasional papers. For 
the 1990s, MOST is concerned to: 
(a) improve co-operation and co-ordination between various government bodies 
(b) give top priority to Korean participation in international joint R&D projects 
(c) establish further science parks to stimulate technological innovation on a regional 
basis 
(d) continue increasing the quality and quantity of the S& T workforce 
(e) improve the morale of S& T workers. 
Three areas to be targetted to meet both the social and economic needs ()f Korea: high 
technology; basic technology; and welfare technology. The government aims to become 
a developed economy by the year 2000. The long range S&T plan is central to that goal. 
TABLE 28: MOST's Framework Programme: 1990to-1993 
Technology area 
Information technology 
Mechatronics 
New materials 
Chemicals 
Biotechnology 
Aerospace 
Nuclear energy 
• approximate budgets 1990 - 1993 
Source : MOST (1990a) p2 
Four year budget• 
$ 5,000 million 
-
$ 1 50 million 
$ 155 million 
$ 90 million 
$ 450 million 
-
MOST have outlined a framework programme for the execution of their high technology 
plans. This will run from 1990 and 1996. MOST is to contribute to the projected budget 
of around Won 9, 740bn (approximately $14.2bn). The plan is for $4.2bn to be supplied 
by government and $1 Obn by the private sector (MOST 1990a p 1). 
The proposed programme would be developed through a collaboration between the EPB, 
MTI and MOST. To date, there is no firm indication that this programme has been 
accepted formally, but the plans do parallel others put forward by the EPB and the MTI. 
They also demonstrate the overall commitment to S&T in Korea. 
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MOST's framework programme would cover the seven fields shown in Table 28. Some of 
the key technology targets included in the programme are as follows: 
- VLSI and ASIC capabilities: 16M DRAM by 1991; 64M DRAM by 1993 
- intelligent, networking computers 
- enabling information technologies: semiconductors; software techniques (IKBS and 
automated software development) 
- optical and optoelectronics activities. 
- MOST is to support 1 00 university centres of excellence in basic research 
As far as promoting basic technology is concerned, MOST wish to target and fund a new 
cadre of "superior" R&D institutes, selected on the basis of region and R&D field. It is 
proposed that 30 institutes are to be selected in 1990. The target is 100 dedicated centres 
of excellence by 2001. According to interviews carried out (see Part 1 ), these centres are 
to be located within the academic sector. Thirteen such centres have already been 
established. 
TABLE 29 : Promoting basic technology : ·superior• R&D institutes 
Region Field 
Seoul area new materials, polymer micro-
organism, medical engineering 
Central region AI, sensor engineering, bio-
processing 
South West semiconductors, catalyst 
engineering, environment 
South East factury automation, aerospace, 
ocean 
Source: MOST (1990al p3 
The promotion of welfare technology is a relatively new departure for Korea and the policy 
outline is very thin. Four areas of activity are mentioned in the MOST document (1990a): 
- water purification 
- health and medical technologies 
- housing technology 
-automatic signal processing. 
MOST has also put forward a strategy outline for: (a) the R&D workforce; (b) 
commercialisation of R&D results; and (c) international collaboration. 
(a) Plans for the R&D workforce 
The government accepts that Korea's R&D workforce is still relatively underdeveloped 
(public and private) and that problems of quality are likely to be compounded by a major 
shortfall in personnel (estimated at 200,000 by 2001) as the S&T policies take shape over 
the next decade. 
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The government therefore plans to: 
• increase the proportion of science students to social scientists from thEi present level 
of 49% to 55% by 1993 
• enable graduate students to get the opportunity to participate in GFI programmes 
• provide tax concessions on high technology educational infrastructure a1nd equipment 
• take a more pro-active role in re-educating private sector S& T personnel in GFis 
• provide conditional exemption from military service for researchers 
• intensify repatriation of Korean nationals from overseas 
·extend the recruitment of non-Korean national scientists and technologists. 
(b) Plans for the commercialisation of R&D results 
The government intends to strengthen design, production and engineering capabilities 
through a number of measures including: 
• the setting up of engineering R&D centres 
• reducing the private sector risks involved in the commercialisation of innovative high 
technology products and processes (how this is to be achieved is not dliscussed) 
• the setting up of funds to ensure that finance is available for personne1l, technology 
or information associated with the 
• commercialisation of public sector innovations. 
11.2.3.5. The EPB's "ultra modern technology industry promotiion 
programme" 
In parallel to MOST's programme in S& T, the EPB announced in February 1990 the first 
phase of a seven year "ultra modern technology industry promotion programme". 
The EPB called for an increase in investment in high technology industries; to 4% of the 
nation's GNP, from the current level of 2.6%. This would place Korea among the top 
international spenders (in terms of GNP percentages: US R&D spend accounted for 2.8% 
in 1986, while Japan's spending amounted to 2.5%). If the goal is met, Korea's total 
investment in technology over the seven year period 1990 to 1996 will be roughly Won 38 
trillion. 
Of the projected Won 38 trillion, the EPB plan estimates that 70% will be accounted for 
by private industry and the remainder from government sources. Table 29 contains targets 
outlined by the EPB. 
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TABLE 30: Technologies expected to be developed 
Fields R&D sectors Expenditure • 
(1990 to 1996) 
Information industry - intelligent computer 10-15 
- HDTV 
- Ga-As ultra speed ICs 
- laser optics 
Mechatronics - intelligent robotics 5-7 
- ultra precision machine tools 
- CIM 
New materials - fine ceramics 4-5 
- high-polymics 
- metals and semiconductor 
material 
Biotechnologies - non polluting genetic 2-3 
pesticide 
Precision chemistry (incl. - new substances 2-3 
genetic eng.) - functional chemicals 
New energy - energy saving gas turbine 3-4 
Aeronautics, space, -wind force 3-4 
ocean - power plant 
Public welfare - high-technology medical 1-2 
technology instruments, prevention of 
environmental pollution 
Total 30-43 
Source : EPB (1990) 
• Expenditure in Won Trillions 
Some reports on the EPB plan also included computer design and production for 
shipbuilding, cost Won 150bn; and a super-speed magnetic-guided train ("Maglev system") 
cost Won 330bn. 
According to the EPB plan, Korea intends to capture 1 /5 of the world's intelligent computer 
market by the year 2000 (a market valued at $120bn). Korea is also to become a major 
exporter of computer software for intelligent computers. This ambitious plan also speaks 
of overtaking Japan as the number one shipbuilding nation by the year 2001 and of 
capturing $4bn of the world's chip market by 1995. 
The plan expects other government bodies such as the Ministries of Defence, 
Communications, Health and Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery to contribute to the scheme. 
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TABLE 31 : MTt T echnofogy programmes (by sector in Won bifllons) 
1990-1994 1995-2000 
Facility R&D total Facility R&D total 
investment investment 
Micro-electronics 68.2 47.8 116.0 - - -
Mechatronics 4.8 1.0 5.8 13.7 2.8 16.5 
Aerospace 4.0 3.6 7.5 
New Materials 37.4 25.7 62.1 120.10 59.8 179.9 
Fine chemicals 24.0 10.4 34.3 39.6 25.0 64.5 
Bio-technology - 4.2 - - - -
Laser - 20.5 - - -
Total spend : Won 511.3 bn 
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry (cited in Fer EMtern Economic Review, 28 September 1989 p1·42) 
11.2.3.6. MTI's technology plans 
The MTI has also announced a number of technology programmes intended tc1 promote the 
development of so-called key bottleneck technologies. A special fund was St~t up in 1987 
with initial funding of Won 1 Obn ($15.04m) to support SMEs. This is expect«!d to broaden 
to include the Chaebol in 1990. 
The fund subsidises projects up to 40% to 80% in areas such as heat treatment, printing, 
lithography and moulding. The scheme was felt to have been successful andl in 1989 MTI 
increased the fund to Won 24bn and extended eligibility to large companies. For instance, 
MTI is now committed to allocate Won BOrn to a three year 16 megabit DRAM project 
involving Samsung, Hyundai and Goldstar (Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 September, 
1989). 
The MTI has recently put forward a five year technology development proje1ct to develop 
seven key technology areas. The five year project includes microelectronics (e.g. 
semiconductors), machine tools and robotics (including mechatronics), aerospace (including 
the FX fighter and the HX helicopter), new materials (metals ceramics and polymers), fine 
chemicals, lasers and biotechnology. Forecast expenditures for each of these areas are 
presented in Table 31. 
11.2.3. 7. Information Industry Programme 
In May 1990 the Korean Economic Journal (May 7, 1990) reported that the government 
intended to foster the IT industry with a large infusion of public funds. The draft plans 
include setting up a telecommunications college to train information specialists and an 
expansion of standards research. Construction of teleports and new media cities will be 
promoted, as will SMEs in areas such as office and factory automation. 
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The draft also calls for a restructuring of the regulatory environment for information. 
Bi-directional cable TV services are to begin in 1992, HDTV services in the mid-1990s and 
an independent satellite service by 1996. 
R&D projects include super-conducting optical memory circuits, intelligent computers, ISDN 
(integrated services digital network), VANs (value added networks) and data base services. 
Total spending is expected to reach Won 5.2 trillion by the year 2000. The large bulk of 
the funding is to be from the government (Won 5.0 trillion). The remaining Won 200 billion 
is to be raised from private sources. In May 1990 the plans had been through public 
hearings and were expected to be finalised by the government in June 1990. 
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ANNEX 1 -MAJOR KOREAN S&T {AND RELATED) MINISTRIES, 
INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 
ANNEX 2 - SEMICONDUCTOR CASE STUDY 
ANNEX 3 - TELECOMMUNICATIONS ·CASE STUDY 
ANNEX 4 - HIGH-DEFINITION TELEVISION {HOTV) 

ANNEX 1 : MAJOR KOREAN S& T (AND RELATED) MINISTRIES, 
INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 
1. Economic Planning Board (EPB) 
Overall economic performance and policy 
- forthcoming 7th 5 year development plan 
- long-term perspective plan 
Industrial performance and policy 
- leading growth sectors 
- role of SMEs 
- structural adjustment 
Technology transfer 
- import of foreign technologies (foreign direct investment, license c:ontracts etc) 
- role of the US and Japan (compared to Europe) 
- steering mechanisms for the import of technology 
- restrictive clauses etc 
- export of technology 
2. Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) 
Main features of S& T policy and strategy 
- legal and administrative infrastructure 
- institutional infrastructure 
- main actor in S& T policy and co-ordination 
- major overall and sectoral targets 
- medium- and long-term technology development plans 
- long term plan of Science and Technology towards the year 2000 
- links between industrial and S& T policy 
- incentive systems for promoting private R&D and innovation,. with special 
reference to SMEs 
R&D activities (R&D expenditure and manpower) 
- growth, sectoral structure and main areas of R&D activities 
- R&D activities of public research institutes, universities and industrial enterprises, 
with special reference to SMEs 
- links between public and private research activities (co-C)peration and 
co-ordination) 
- important R&D programmes at the national and sectoral level 
- effectiveness and success of public research activities (transf•ar of research 
results to the industrial sector) 
- basic research 
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International S& T co-operation (R&D and training) 
- co-operation with the US and Japan 
- co-operation with other industrialised countries, especially with Europe 
- potential fields for strengthening the co-operation with Europe 
3. Korea Development Institute (KDI) 
- industrial sector focus 
- medium- and long-term development policy and strategy, 
- sectoral priorities 
- present and future structural adjustment problems 
- main growth constraints and problem areas 
- strong economic and technological dependence on Japan and the US 
- monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures 
- environmental problems 
- social tensions 
- potential fields for co-operation with Europe 
4. Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) 
Foreign trade 
- growth and structure of foreign trade 
- US and Japan as trading partners 
- export performance, especially high technology goods 
- trade policy (formal and informal trade restrictions) 
Industry 
- industrial performance (at the sectoral level) 
- medium- and long-term targets 
- sectoral priorities 
- incentive system with special reference to SMEs 
- monopolistic and oligopolistic market structures and 
related policies 
Intellectual property rights 
- patent and copyright law 
5. Ministry of Communications/Electronics and Telecommunications 
Research Institute (ETRI) 
- establishing an important microelectronics sector 
- transfer of technology from abroad (US and Japan) 
- foreign technology transfer problems 
- public procurement programmes as incentives for local industry 
- medium- and long-term technology targets 
- major research programmes in the field of electronics and telecommunications 
- co-operation and co-ordination between public research institutes and private R&D 
units 
- R&D co-operation with foreign countries 
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6. Ministry of Energy and Resources/Korea Advanced Energy Research 
Institute (KAERI)/Korea Institute of Energy Resources (KIER) 
- problems and policies in the energy sector 
- nuclear energy for the medium- and long-term 
- nuclear safety standards and waste treatment 
- transfer of technology from abroad 
- major research programmes in the field of nuclear energy 
- R&D co-operation with foreign countries 
7. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
- problems and policy in the agricultural sector 
-major research programmes (e.g. biotechnology) 
- S& T co-operation with foreign countries 
8. Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 
- problems and policy in the health sector 
- major research programmes (e.g. bio-technology) 
- S& T co-operation with foreign countries 
9. Ministry of Education 
- basic education 
- undergraduate training 
- manpower formation in S& T (mainly in natural and technical sciences) 
- medium- and long-run targets 
Annex 1 
10. Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)!Korea Institute of 
Technology (KIT) 
- training of highly qualified R&D personnel 
-R&D links with the industrial sector 
- overcoming bottlenecks in the supply of R&D personnel 
- manpower formation in S& T 
- medium- and long-run targets 
11. Ministry of Environment 
-environmental problems (water pollution. air pollution, waste etc.) 
- environmental policy 
- major research programmes in the field of environment 
- S& T co-operation with foreign countries 
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12. Korea Standards Research Institute (KSRI) 
- policy in the field of industrial standards 
- adoption of international standards 
- development of national standards 
- co-operation in the field of standards development with foreign countries 
13. Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) 
Including: 
- Environmental Engineering & Science Laboratory (Department of KIST) 
- Center for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP) 
- Genetic Engineering Center (GEC, affiliated to KIST) 
Areas covered: 
- S&T policy 
- environmental problems 
- health problems 
- biotechnology 
- S& T co-operation with foreign institutes 
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ANNEX 2: SEMICONDUCTOR CASE STUDY 
Following Byun and Ahn (1989) the development of the Korean semiconductor industry can 
be divided into four stages: 
1. The embryonic stage (1965 to 1973) 
The origin of the Korean semiconductor industry began in 1 965 with a Korean-US joint 
venture (KOMG) to assemble transistors. Other foreign semiconductor firms were 
encouraged to set up offshore plants and begin assembly of discrete devices in the 1960s. 
US companies included Signetics, Fairchild and Motorola. 
These offshore plants gave Korean individuals direct experience of semiconductor 
assembly. Korean industrialists gained their first insight into the workings of the world 
semiconductor industry. During the late 1 960s two domestic firms began the assembly of 
discrete devices. 
2. The transitional stage (1974 to 1982) 
In 1974 a firm founded by a domestic investor and a Korean-American technical expert 
began producing large scale integration (LSI) watch chips. The technical expert provided 
local Korean technicians with design and wafer fabrication capabilities which were not 
directly accessible within offshore assembly operations. 
In 1979 a major household electronic appliance manufacturer linked up with AT&T to begin 
wafer fabrication of LSis. Production during the 1970s and early 1 980s concentrated on 
components for household appliances such as televisions, hi-fi and calculato1rs. 
During the late 1970s, domestic firms did not actively conduct R&D or promote technology 
transfer from the international producers. Mass production and new product development 
capabilities were outside of the scope of Korean firms. They lacked the financial, 
technological and marketing capabilities needed to become an international player. Other 
more lucrative opportunities open to Korean industrialists and financiers were~ much lower 
risk then semiconductors. 
The government, however, had began to realise the strategic importance of se1miconductor 
technology. It founded a technical graduate school and assigned one of the universities to 
specialise in electronic engineering. The government also set up ETRI (see Annex 1) 
3. The expansion and take-off stage ( 1983 to 1987) 
Byun and Ahn (1989) argue that the semiconductor industry, which had bE!en relatively 
passive since its inception, was divided into two parts around 1 983 when Samsung 
Electronics produced its first 64K DRAM. 
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The two major groupings were (a} Samsung and Hyundai and (b) Goldstar. The groups 
chose very different paths. Samsung began major investments in manufacturing and 
product development, while Goldstar was content to continue as before. Hyundai (which 
had already amassed an industrial fortune through construction, shipbuilding and 
automotive interests) began a programme to construct large-scale plants for the mass 
production of memory devices. 
In the four year period 1982 to 1986, Korean electronics companies invested about $1 bn 
in facilities and around $180m in R&D, unprecedented sums by Korean standards. 
During 1985 the international market for 64K DRAMs levelled out. In addition, Japanese 
firm were (allegedly) dumping 64K devices onto the market as they moved up to 256K 
DRAMs. Korean industry had to endure heavy losses during this period. The increasing 
rate of technological development also threatened Korean firms' future profitability. 
Shortened product life cycles meant that firms had to graduate quickly to new generation 
products. · 
In addition to falling prices and weak demand in 1985, nearly all of Korea's chip makers 
were accused of infringement of patent rights. They also had major problems with quality 
control, marketing and establishing an acceptable international brand image. 
After 1986 the world DRAM market recovered to the benefit of Korean firms. Korean firms 
also benefitted from the imposition, by the US, of restrictions on imports of Japanese 
chips, in response to dumping. This had the effect of creating chip shortages and raising 
prices. 
The Korean Government made significant efforts to promote the industry through support 
for R&D (direct and indirect), financing, marketing and manpower training. 
Several private research institutes specialising in R&D for leading edge semiconductor 
technology were also established, as were "outpost" operations in Silicon Valley (e.g. 
Samsung Semiconductor USA). The US operations aimed to gather new technical 
information and develop new products using US technical expertise. 
These organisations apparently played a critical role in overcoming the shortage of high 
quality technical expertise. 
Changed business attitudes led to an impressive upgrading of the Korean semiconductor 
industry, resulting in remarkable growth in production (for details see Byun and Ahn, 1989, 
Table 4, p645). Exports grew from around $600m in 1982 to $1.36bn in 1986 and to 
$2.8bn in 1988 (growth for the first nine months of 1989 was around 25%). 
Samsung became the 13th largest semiconductor manufacturer in the world in 1989, with 
semiconductor sales of $1 .3bn (this was made up largely of high volume, low margin 
DRAMs). 
As well as the growth in production and export volumes, Korean industry achieved 
remarkable progress in technological accumulation. While the 64K DRAM, developed in 
1983, depended almost exclusively on foreign technology, the one and four megabit 
DRAMS required a considerable technological input from domestic chip makers. 
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4. Self-supportive stage (1988 onwar4s) 
By 1990, Korean industry h:ad the capacity to m&s- produce one megabit DRAMs, one 
megabit ROMs and 256 twobit SRAMs. In 1989 Samsung produced in the order of five 
million one megabit DRAMs per month. The company planned to be one of the first in the 
world to mass produce four megabit ORAMs in the mid-1990s. The four megabit project 
was a collaborative development effort within Korea involving ETRI, Samst.nng, Goldstar, 
Hyundai and the MTI. Collaborative work also began on the 16 megabit OR:AM. 
- The Goldstar-Hitachi venture 
Goldstar, for a long period, trailed behind Korea's memory manufacturers. Instead the 
company concentrated on producing smaller volumes of lower risk products such as logic 
devices. 
However, in 1989 Goldstar signed a major agreement to access the technology and 
manufacturing expertise for Hitachi's one megabit DRAM. Hitachi hopes to benefit from a 
secure production source and from freeing up its own resources for more lucrative 
activities. Goldstar hopes to gain fabrication capacity, technical assistancE,, chip design 
advice and so on. Goldstar Bectron, the group's newly formed chip divisi1on expects to 
invest $2.2bn in a new wafer fabrication facility at Chungju by 1997 (Far Eas1tem Economic 
Review, 24 August 1989). 
- ASICs 
By 1 990 Korean firms were poised to enter the more complex area of applic:ation specific 
integrated circuits (ASICs) via a mix of domestic farms and joint ventures with US, 
Japanese and European firms. The Korean ftrm Anam, which boasts one of the largest 
memory assembly plants in the world, formed a joint venture with VLSI Technology of the 
US to develop ASICs. Goldstar set up a dedicated ASIC department at its R&D institute 
and plans to expand the share of ASICs in its semiconductor range from 8% in 1989 to 
25% by 1992. 
- Skill shortages 
The most difficult problem faced by domestic firms in the iate 1 980s was the shortage of 
high level skills for product development. Imported technology from foreign competitors 
became increasingly problematic. The Japanese, in particular, attempted to reduce 
transfers to the Korean "upstarts". However, the large scale Hitachi-Goldstar partnership 
illustrates that, despite concerted efforts, there are commercial pressures on Jlapanese firms 
to form joint ventures with Korean companies and to supply technology to them. 
Korean firms have tended to collaborate with other firms and research organisations to 
develop new products. In return they offer a long-term investment commitment and the 
promise of high quality, high volume production. 
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TABLE 32 : Recent international technology transfer agreements in the 
Korean semiconductor industry 
Samsung Group 
Intel 1 megabit EPROM; DRAMs; & SRAMs 
Texas Instruments semiconductors • 
Unysis semiconductors • 
Sharp CMOS 
DITTI (FRG) BiCMOS 
Exel semiconductors • 
Lucky-Goldstar Group 
United Microtek (USA) 1M DRAM & SRAM; ACMOS TTL IC 
Advanced Micro-Devices 64K DRAM 
LSI Logic gate arrays 
Zilog 16-bit NMOS mcps 
Hitachi 1M DRAM 
Hyundai Group 
TJ 64K & 256K DRAMs 
I NMOS 256K DRAM 
MOS Electronics 1M DRAM 
LSI Logic gate arrays 
Alto Corp (Japan) semiconductors • 
Daewoo Group 
Zymos MOS IC 
• area unspecified 
Source : Derived from Bloom (1989) 
- The role of the government 
The government played a critical role as mediator in collaborative efforts in promoting chip 
developments. It also provided subsidies for R&D and other incentives (see Part II). With 
the participating firms, the government established a joint R&D fund, then research teams 
proposed research plans. Next, a committee composed of technical experts (from 
government, research institutes and companies), under the supervision of ETRI, evaluated 
and selected research projects. Amounts allocated to individual teams were adjusted 
according to the committee's continuing evaluation of research progress. In this way, 
relatively small sums resulted in greater interest in R&D, and significantly improved 
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domestic R&D capabilities. The joint development of the 16 megabit DRAM between 
Samsung, Goldstar, Hyundai and the MTI is a case in point. 
- Assessment of Korean technological capabilities 
According to Bloom (1989), most R&D has been directed towards the indigenous 
production of products first appearing overseas, with relatively little emphasis on 
indigenous design. This position may have changed somewhat with the domestic design 
effort attached to the one, four and sixteen megabit DRAMs. 
Korean firms lag behind the Japanese and US leaders in terms of: 
- wafer size (one generation behind) 
-new materials (especially areas such as Ga-As, HEMT, JJs 
-CAD and CAE workstations and software, including cell libraries for ASICs 
- VLSI masks (except Samsung) are supplied by Japan and US 
-line widths (one generation behind leaders, e.g. 1.5 micron DRAMs) 
- fabrication and other capital equipment (import dependent on the US and Japan) 
-factory automation selective (little CIM or CIM research) 
Source: Jun end Kim, 1989, p41 (data from ETRI internal reports) 
On the positive side, Korean firms are moving swiftly to build up capabilities in these areas. 
Also, Korea is up with the world leaders in terms of assembly, productivitv and testing. 
Korean firms still lag behind their competitors in terms of establishing international 
marketing networks and international brand awareness. In house R&D capabilities are 
weak. Korean industry has yet to offer creative new products to the market. However, 
current efforts to develop ASICs and other complex chips suggest this sta{Je is not too far 
off in the future. 
Industrial concentration and scale of enterprise will remain the linchpin of Korean chip 
efforts. In electronics overall the four Chaebol control around 60% of production, 40% of 
all foreign technology agreements and 80% of all research activity (Bloom, 1989). 
- Future challenges 
Korean companies believe they must localise manufacturing equipment and materials. Most 
are imported from the US and Japan. Major equipment is typically controlled by leading 
semiconductor manufacturers and sometimes witheld for competitive reasons. Recently, 
Korea has established some joint ventures for materials, leadframe equipment, bonding 
wire, wafers, chemicals and glass. 
To improve their market prospects, firms are aware of the need to offer proprietary designs 
based on in-house design capabilities. 
Korean firms depend on foreign markets for more than 90% of their total production 
volume. Industry wishes to increase the domestic share of consumptic1n to reduce its 
vulnerability to future worldwide recessions. 
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- Implications for the EC 
Despite EC concerns over problems of market access, IPR and so on, Korean firms appear 
to be accessing leading edge technoiogy from the Japanese and US market leaders. The 
motivation on the part of foreign companies is commercial. Korea is a large and expanding 
market for technology, components, consultancy services and so on. IPR and other 
problems appear to be resolved at the firm level, within partnerships. Also, Commission 
concerns expressed to SRA over "breeding a competitor" appear to be misplaced - a 
formidable competitor already exists. 
At the individual firm level, there may be opportunities for some EC firms to form joint 
ventures with Korean companies, given the efforts by Japan to restrict transfers of capital 
goods and design technologies. In this event it is not clear that the Commission would 
have a role to play. Problems and opportunities would need to be resolved by the firms 
involved on a case by case basis, as is currently the practice. Any logistical support as 
might be deemed necessary or desirable could be provided by the embassy representing the 
national government of the European firm, rather than the Commission. 
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- The key role of telecommunications 
The telecommunications sector embodies technology necessary for the country to meet a 
number of national objectives laid down in Korean industrial and economic objectives for 
the 1990s. These include: 
- consolidation of the information technology industry 
- infrastructure for the modern information economy 
- reduction of dependence on foreign technology in key sectors 
- increasing shares of the market in both the developed and developing countries. 
At the present time, Korea is weak in a number of key enabling technologies. In the past, 
major aspects of Korean telecommunications, including hardware, software~ and services 
have been protected from overseas interests. As Korea attempts t01 upgrade its 
infrastructure and improve its capabilities, opportunities in the domestic market are likely 
to increase. 
- Orientation of the telecommunications sector 
As Jun and Kim ( 1989) shows in detail, telecommunications is the only major sector of the 
Korean electronics industry which has not been export orientated. Unlike consumer 
electronics, computers and semiconductors, the telecommunications sector was developed 
to satisfy internal infrastructural needs. Exceptions include some terminal products, mobile 
handsets and, in 1989, the sale of a small number of digital public exchanjJe systems to 
the Philippines, Pakistan and other countries. 
Unlike other Korean electronics sectors, domestic demand far exceeds foreign demand. 
The public sector is by far the biggest customer for switching system:s, networking 
technologies and terminals. 
Growth of the telecommunications industry has been slow in comparison to other 
electronics sectors. Production of the Ericsson AXE digital exchange technology began 
under licence in 1983. This has now been localised and developed into the TDX-1, which 
has formed the basis for rural digitalisation. In some regions (e.g. Seoul and Pusan) the 
government, through the Korea Telecom Authority (KTA) has installed ATl!LT and Alcatel 
switches. 
- Government objectives 
Although the industry is currently small, the government is determined to promote its full 
transition into an internationally competitive industry. The government is also committed 
to a modern telecommunications infrastructure with a targeted 70% penetration of voice 
communications, ISDN in the main conurbations and extensive private networks and VANs 
by the turn of the century. Although the government is likely to continue its policy of 
import substitution as Korean suppliers improve their capabilities, upgrading the network 
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is likely to require increased international co-operation both in services and in equipment 
and technology. 
- International collaboration 
Monopsony purchasing power has allowed the government to insist that foreign firms seek 
joint ventures with the Chaebol in order to bid for public sector orders. Consequently, a 
number of international co-operative technological ventures have developed with major 
foreign producers, mostly US and Japanese. 
In areas such as exchange and transmission equipment exports are beginning. These are 
based mainly on foreign technology licencing and joint ventures arrangements. 
- Industrial structure 
The telecommunications sector is highly concentrated and dominated by three Chaebol: 
Samsung, Goldstar and Daewoo. These three firms boast an extensive product range 
(switching, transmission and terminals) as well as vertical integration into components. 
Hyundai has niche market capabilities in telephone and mobile terminal equipment. The 
company's strategy is to build up market share in sectors such as private exchanges, 
transmission equipment and TV satellite dishes. 
Another important player is OPC (Oriental Precision Corporation) which has a joint venture 
between a number of Korean companies and the Swedish firm LM Ericsson. Ericsson has 
been actively involved in the development, production and marketing of the TDX-1 public 
exchange (10,100 to 20,000 line capacity). It has also begun to transfer technology for 
its more advanced replacement, the TDX-1 0 ( 100,000 line capacity). This exchange has 
performance characteristics equivalent to some of the most advanced in the world. The 
first systems are due for installation in Korea in 1993. 
As in most countries, market domination by the entrenched market leaders and government 
purchasing policy act as barriers to direct entry by foreign competitors. However, as Table 
33 shows, many international companies have found access to the Korean market via joint 
ventures. 
- The service sector 
The Korean Government monopolises the supply of telephone services through the KT A and 
data communications through DACOM (the Data Communications Corporation). 
The government has made a public commitment to liberalise services gradually over the 
next few years. The VAN market is to be opened up in the early 1990s. According to 
some domestic and overseas residents, the current quality of service provision and 
technical support is very poor. 
The government sees integration, speed and intelligence as the key elements of future 
systems. The R&D efforts of both the KT A and Ministry of Communications have been 
predominantly geared towards ISDN. According to Jun and Kim (1989) Korea has made 
major strides towards the devel.opment of indigenous time division digital switching, 
semiconductor inputs, optical communications and ISDN software. 
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TABLE 33 : Technical affiliations of the Korean telecommunications industrv, 1988 
Public exchanges Private exchanges 
company model company model 
Golds tar AT&T 5ESS NEC NEAX-2400 
Samsung Alcatel S 1240 Rolm CBX 
Daewoo NTT SL-1 
OPC/Otelco Ericsson AXE 1 0 Ericsson MD-110 
Hyundai Fujitsu ABCS 
Source : Jun end Kim (1989) p46, original date from MTI 
- Assessment of technological capabilities 
A full listing of Korean technological capabilities and weakness is provided by Jun and Kim 
(1989) p48. To summarise some of their main findings, Korea lags behind the market 
leaders in terms of: 
-broadband ISDN exchange R&D 
- ASICs for public exchanges 
- design and software automation for exchanges 
- network integration into LAN equipment 
- voice, data and video integrated exchanges (private) 
- broadband transmission 
- optical subscriber systems 
- protocol conversion 
- digital microwave 
- satellite system design 
- mobile system design and production 
- VLSI for mobile communications 
- high performance teletex design 
- videotex standards 
- high performance videophone 
In several cases (e.g. optical transmission, digital microwave, and facsimiliel Korea is only 
one generation behind the world leaders. In fields such as narrowband IS[)N, hardware 
design for public exchanges, private exchanges for voice and data, satellite t:>peration and 
maintenance and teletex manufacturing, Korea is on par with the world leadlers. 
- Efforts to improve capabilities 
In areas such as data capture and switching Korea lacks asynchronous technologies, 
broadband, ASICs and BiCMOS technology. Systems design and communications software 
capabilities are only just beginning to emerge. A major R&D joint ventures between 
Samsung, Goldstar, Daewoo and Otelco is attempting to rectify current weaknesses in 
these areas. These efforts are coordinated by ETRI and supported by the link.s with AT&T, 
Alcatel and Ericsson. 
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In transmission technology Korean firms are weak in optical materials and optoelectronics 
(lasers, repeaters etc.) and again VLSI components, systems design and production 
capabilities. Optical transmission is another focus for R&D. This has been encouraged by 
Korea's link into the trans-Pacific submarine optical fibre system between the South Island, 
Hong Kong, Japan and through to the States. 
KT A and ETRI are active in the development of junction lasers, wavelength division 
mutliplexing and new optical fibre materials. KAIST and the Korean Fibre Optic 
Communication Company along with the German HHI group have been central to Korea's 
development of optical fibre technological capability. 
The Koreans have accumulated some design and production capabilities for single mode 
terminals, such as telephone sets and mobile handsets and facsimilie machines. In 
terminals Korean firms' main weaknesses lie in standards and high performance design. 
The move towards more intelligent, high performance terminals such as the G4 fax and 
videophones is dependent upon new design capabilities, new media services and ASIC 
components. 
- ISDN and digitalisation 
ISDN has been the overall medium-term goal which has set the Korean telecommunications 
research agenda. The Koreans expect to have a comprehensive functional public integrated 
services digital network by the end of the decade. 
Digitalisation of the telecommunications system is being driven by the Ministry of 
Communications and KT A. While Korea has design and production capabilities for the 
passive and structural elements of telecommunications systems, firms remain weak in the 
largest (and fastest growing) elements: complex semiconductors and software. 
R&D is being applied to the "domestification" of volume components such as network 
terminating equipment, optical transmitters and receivers as well as ASIC design technology 
for switching systems. 
- International co-operation 
Korea is a member of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the Asia Pacific 
Telecommunication (APT) organisation. It is an associate member of INTELSAT (the 
international satellite organisation) and is collaborating with the International Maritime 
Satellite Organisation. On international standards, ETRI is participating in CCITI and ISO 
standards work. 
According to one report, by the end of 1 988, KT A had established bilateral technology 
co-operation agreements with eight organisations from five countries. Another two 
co-operative agreements are due to commence in 1990. These will be with the French and 
Spanish Telecommunications authorities for assistance with the 1992 Olympics in 
Barcelona. 
ETRI has developed a number of accords with international research institutes, notably: HHI 
(W. Germany), AT&T and BCR in the US, Northern Telecom in Canada, Alcatel NV in the 
Netherlands and Ericsson of Sweden. ETRI has also had talks or contact with SRI in the 
US, the UK Alvey programme, NIT in Japan and CNET and INRIA in France (among others). 
ETRI is also engaged in a semiconductor materials development project with Tokyo 
University. 
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-Important telecommunications-related institutions include: 
- Ministry of Communication 
-Korea Telecommunication Authority (KTA) 
-Data Communications Corporation of Korea (DACOM) 
- Korea Telecommunication Industry Cooperative 
- Korea Information Industry Association (Seoul) 
- KT A Research Centre (Seoul) 
- System Engineering Research Institute (Seoul) 
- ETRI (Choong Nam) 
- Dongyang Electronics (Otelco R&D Centre) 
- MAXON Technology Institute 
- Goldstar Electronic R&D Laboratory 
- Samsung Semiconductor and Telecommunications R&D Centre 
- Implications for EC-Korean co-operation 
EC firms are poorly represented in the Korean telecommunications field. It is likely that, in 
the future, some liberalisation of network services will take place as Korec:1 attempts to 
upgrade its telecommunications infrastructure, particularly in the areas of business 
communications, VANs and mobile communicat~ons. This could provide opportunities for 
European market leaders to gain access to the Korean market. 
In the area of equipment, Korean firms are faced with the need to access world class 
technology. Several European firms could potentially supply this under joint venture 
arrangements. Currently, Alcatel is the main EC firm engaged in technoiOtiY transfer to 
Korea. Japan and US have strong traditional links in the telecommunication!; field. Some 
are keen to increase their activities within Korea (as is Ericsson of Sweden). 
IPR and market access problems do not appear to act as barriers to technoiO!JY transfer to 
Korea in near-to-market technology activities such as telecommunications. Problems 
appear to be resolved by the firms engaged in joint ventures with Korean companies. 
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ANNEX 4 : HIGH-DEFINITION TELEVISION (HDTV) 
- The importance of TV to Korean electronics 
Consumer electronics accounts for roughly 40% of total Korean electronics exports and 
production. Within the electronics sector, colour TV has been the single large1st export item 
until 1988 when VCR took the lead in terms of export sales. In 1988 colour TV exports 
amounted to $517m (3.9m sets) (Jun and Kim 1989). 
TV has been the "cash cow" of the Korean electronics industry. Korea is today one of the 
largest colour TV producers in the world. Within Korea, Samsung, Goldstar and Daewoo 
account for around 98% of total colour TV output. 
However, Korea's international marketing capabilities are weak in relation to production 
capacity. Fifty to sixty percent of Korea's TV output is made under OEM arrangements and 
sold under foreign buyers' own brand names. In addition, Korean firms invariably occupy 
the low end of the market where prices and profit margins are low. 
- Government commitment to HDTV 
Although late in starting, Korea is now fully committed to the next generati,on of TVs, the 
HDTV. The MTI announced in March 1990, plans for an HDTV export industry by 1993. 
A consortium of private companies, the nation's broadcasting corporation and several R&D 
institutes committed a total of $150m over the period 1990 to 1994. 
Work will be directed at developing HDTV reception, transmission, industri,al applications 
and telecommunications. However, MTI admits that Korea is several ye.ars behind the 
market leaders in Japan, the US and Europe. 
- Assessment of Korean technological capabilities 
In conventional colour TV Korea's main strengths lie in mass-manufacturing scale-intensive 
operations. According to Jun and Kim (1989), Korea is relatively weak in research and 
development (most areas) and digital circuitry (design and manufacture) and computer 
integrated manufacturing. In terms of assembly (e.g. chip insertion and automatic 
soldering) Korea is almost on par with Japanese market leaders. 
In HDTV their technological capability is far weaker than in colour TV. In areas such as 
display production technology, HDTV projectors, integrated circuitry (e.g. decoders, signal 
processors and converters) and flat panel antennae, Korean companies are far behind the 
world technology frontier. 
The danger for Korea is that the market will shift to HDTV, leaving Korean industry with 
a large technology gap to close. Korean strategists are also concerned over their acute 
dependence on Japan. 
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- Korean strategies towards hardware technology 
Korean industry tends to see the importance of HDTV in the longer term. In the short-run, 
companies are most concerned with improving the resolution of picture tubes for traditional 
colour TVs. This market is still expected to be substantial for some time to come. Also, 
enhanced picture tube technology will help prepare Korean firms for HDTV entry. 
- Korean strategies towards HDTV standards 
One of the most important decisions facing Korean producers is deciding on which standard 
to follow: Japan's MUSE; the EC's MAC or the forthcoming US ACTV standard. According 
to Jun and Kim's analysis (19891 Japan offers technological superiority, the US the largest 
market. In contrast, the EC is seen as "not generous in both the entry barriers of 
technology and market" (p801. Jun and Kim see the EC standard as a third choice, despite 
its possible advantage in terms of the large number of countries working on the MAC 
standard. 
Jun and Kim argue that Korean industry will eventually vote for the US system for three 
reasons: ( 11 the US system allows the continued use of traditional TV sets; (2) Korean firms 
expect more in the way of technology transfer from US firms than their Japanese and 
European counterparts; (31 recent partnerships with Japanese firms have proved difficult 
in areas where Korea is a major competitor. 
Jun and Kim may be premature in their assessment. Japan and Korea have already begun 
a JOint programme. In exchange for permission from the Korean Telecommunications 
Authority to transmit MUSE coverage of the closing ceremonies of the Olympic Games in 
Seoul in 1988, NHK agreed to transfer some aspects of MUSE technology to Samsung and 
Goldstar. Each of the two companies despatched a dozen engineers to Japan in order to 
receive training on MUSE decoder systems and, according to some sources, prototype 
circuit diagrams of the decoder. The engineers returned to Japan for further assistance in 
callibrating the decoder's digital code in 1990. 
Some Korean sources say that the transfer from Japan was in fact limited. They argue that 
the main MUSE requirement is in the broadcast and transmission technologies, rather than 
the decoder. 
Korean firms believe that the international competition in standards could go either way. 
For example, they believe that the US could adopt a MUSE or MAC format. Alternatively, 
Japan and the EC may adopt a version of the US standard. Korean firm are therefore 
keeping their options open. 
- Investment strategies 
In addition to the problems of chasing a standard, the joint Korean investments noted 
above are miniscule in comparison to the EC, Japanese and US investments. Because of 
the uncertainty over future standards, Korean industry believes that for the time being it 
will have to spread its investments across all three systems. The major forward 
investments will come from industry rather than the government. 
Korean companies appear to be developing experimental HDTV sets based on the MUSE 
standard. This is likely to be followed by R&D efforts on the EC and US standards. 
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According to the Electronic Industries Association of Korea, Samsung, Goldstar and 
Daewoo aim to accumulate mass production capabilities by 1993 and to supply the 
Japanese, US and EC markets in 1994 or 1995. 
- Corporate activities 
Samsung has stepped up its efforts to develop HDTV display screens, devices for treating 
HDTV signals and semiconductor inputs. Its new R&D centre has projects aimed at 
mastering key technologies and devices for the MUSE system and the EC's MAC system. 
Samsung is expected to follow this up with work on the US standard as and when results 
are forthcoming. 
Goldstar recently established an HDTV development council. Its own programme of 
technology development is similar to that of Samsung's. According to one engineer, 
Goldstar is making a strong effort to develop customised chips for use in MUSE technology. 
In contrast to Goldstar and Samsung, Daewoo will not benefit from the link with NHK. 
Nevertheless, spurred on by the normal Chaebol rivalry, Daewoo is determined to invest 
enough in R&D to maintain parity with its Korean competitors. 
- Implications for the EC 
At the present time, major strategic decisions are being taken by Korean companies. 
Opportunities could exist for European firms to share standards technology with Korean 
firms. European firms could benefit from Korea's demonstrated capabilities in mass 
manufacture of television sets. It is conceivabte that one or more European firms could 
form a jointly owned venture with a major Korean manufacturer. (This was, in fact, 
suggested during the field research). 
However, there is a view in Korea that the EC is not •generous· with its technology or its 
market (e.g. Jun and Kim, 1989). Korean firms appear to be adopting a wait-and-see 
approach, not ruling out any particular standard. Most of the effort to pursuade Koreans 
to adopt a standard appears to have been made by Japan, rather than the EC. From the 
Commission's point of view, the linking of general IPR and market access problems to 
EC-Korean collaboration issues, coupled with the negative perspective by some Korean's 
over EC "generosity", could result in an impasse in EC-Korean HDTV co-operation. Given 
Korea's strong capacity in the TV production field, this could be damaging to EC economic 
interests. 
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